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ABSTRACT
A Palestinian State
by
Jennifer A. Hileman-Tabios
Dr. Mehran Tamadonfar, Examination Committee Chair
Associate Professor of Political Science
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
Should an independent, sovereign state of Palestine have the right
to exist? The establishment of an independent Palestinian state is
important because it could possibly end an extended period of violence
with Israel, where civilian casualties have been high, and it could help to
solidify a foundation of political tolerance and acceptance in the Middle
East. Under the proposed two-state solution, an independent Palestinian
state is possible. However, to determine if a Palestinian state is viable, it
will be necessary to examine internal political struggles, economic
resources, systems of communication, political systems and internal and
external political policies. This qualitative research will focus on
examining the resources and systems that would be essential in creating
a solid infrastructure and foundation for the Palestinian people and a
strong, sovereign, internationally recognized Palestinian state.
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INTRODUCTION
The conflict between the Israelis and Palestinians has been raging
since the establishment of Israel after World War II. The European Jews
displaced after the Holocaust desired the present state of Israel, formerly
Palestine, and they were encouraged by other states. It did not seem to
matter, to the Zionists or to the rest of the world, that the land was
already occupied and belonged to the Palestinians. Since the late 1940’s
the Palestinians have been fighting for their right to exist in their
homeland and reclaim their homes. Popular media, however, especially
in the western world, does not paint a realistic picture of the conflict
between the Israelis and Palestinians. The western world, the United
States in particular, fully and blindly, supports Israel and their
oppressive, violent actions against the Palestinians. Over the years, as
Palestinians have fought for their land and homes, different political
groups have come into power to represent the interests of Palestine as a
whole. The Palestine Liberation Organization, the political group Fatah,
and the controversial political group Hamas, have all stood up to Israel in
an attempt to reclaim their land, more presently in the areas of Gaza and
the West Bank. Hamas is controversial because of their violent acts
towards Israel, in an attempt towards resolution, and as a result has
offended parts of the international community. The interference of these
institutions and the international scrutiny of others have made it even
1

more difficult for the Palestinians to make a united stand and establish a
sovereign state. The establishment of a Palestinian state is important
because it could possibly end an extended period of violence, where
civilian casualties have been high, it could help to solidify a foundation of
political tolerance and acceptance in the Middle East and it can promote
positive global change for human rights.
The viability of a Palestinian state has been affected by economic,
political and geographic factors. Several of these obstacles are
compounded by the role that larger countries play. Economically, the
Palestinians are completely dependent on Israel for their success and
survival. If Israel places limitations or restrictions on the Palestinians
and their economic livelihood, the Palestinians are at their mercy as they
have no recourse to supplement their economic earning base. The
political obstacles that Palestinians face are some of the most far
reaching and detrimental to their independent existence. The internal
political corruption in the Palestinian Authority creates problems for the
Palestinians before they even begin to cross international borders. The
lack of political cohesion among Palestinians and their well founded
distrust in their political leaders, results in a disjointed political system
that is not legitimized by the people. To move beyond the internal
obstacles and look at the international political issues only multiplies the
issues facing the Palestinians. The Middle East, as a region, does not
exude a sense of solidarity and unification. Any type of regional support
2

that the Palestinians could use to enforce their political standing is
virtually non existent. One of the Palestinian’s’ major obstacles is their
political relationship with Israel in that externally affects both the
Palestinian’s economic and geographical situations. The fact that the
United States is such a major factor, with their continuous support for
Israel, it compounds the political scenario even further. Geographically
the Palestinians have been separated. The result of the Six Days war in
1967 divided the Palestinian areas of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
The borders that were established and are being resiliently reinforced
prevent the Palestinian people from creating a strong unified state or
sense of community. This major geographic separation of land is not
conducive to the establishment of a state. One of the four characteristics
that a state must have in order to be called a state is territory. Presently,
in addition to the limited territory the Palestinians do have, Israel
continues to enter the West Bank and Gaza Strip, in densely populated
Palestinian communities, to build Jewish settlements. In addition to
tackling the national border issue, Palestinians are also struggling with
the internal geographic problem of communities being divided by the
Israelis. Observing all of the obstacles, both internal and external, that
the Palestinian people are facing, explains why they have been unable to
focus on themselves directly and try to establish a legitimate state.
Several conditions must be met to create a strong, legitimate,
viable Palestinian state. Those characteristics would be a unified
3

geographic territory, a stable, legitimate government, a group of people or
population, typically with cultural ties, and the right to a sovereign
nation. Geographically the issue of a fractured territory has been
introduced. In addition, the Palestinian political system suffers from
several limitations as well. Internally, the Palestinian Authority struggles
to be legitimized. The political struggle between Hamas and Fatah
further complicates the internal dynamic. The Palestinians, as a people,
struggle to unite for their determined agenda. Palestinians are physically
separated. Due to this separation, the Palestinians have many different
loyalties and identities. Ranging from Pan Arabism to Nationalism,
Palestinians do not know how to unite. One overarching, all
encompassing solution seems to undermine the complexity of the
Palestinian people. Sovereignty, the idea that the supreme and absolute
authority of the state rests with the people of that state is a concept that
is being outrageously violated, when it comes to the Palestinians, most
specifically by Israel. Even if the Palestinians were able to overcome all
of the other internal obstacles that face them, if they are not recognized
as a sovereign entity, any progress would be fruitless. The establishment
of a strong, sovereign nation is that the only way that a Palestinian state
will be viable.
A comprehensive look at the history of Palestine and its people, in
addition to an empirical analysis of contemporary issues, through
secondary sources, is necessary to assess the viability of a Palestinian
4

state. Historically, a review of Palestine under British rule, before and
during World War II, would be necessary in establishing the series of
events that have lead to the present Palestinian situation. Next, a closer
look at the history of violence and conflict between the Palestinians and
Israelis will also assist in painting the reality of the present day situation.
The internal and external factors will be evaluated to determine the
interconnectedness of both challenges. A discussion of the foundation of
a solid infrastructure is also necessary in determining how prepared, or
unprepared, the Palestinians are in establishing a viable state. Will new
geographic boundaries be necessary? Is there sufficient political
organization to build roads and schools and develop communities? Is
there enough money to build a solid infrastructure? All of these
questions will be addressed to explain the viability of a Palestinian state.
The fractured internal dynamics of the Palestinians is one of the
major contributing factors to their present day struggle. The internal
issues, such as culture and Palestinian identity, establish and compound
any external issues they might have. Most external obstacles are a direct
result of the internal ones. The Palestinian people are strong enough to
stand on their own and exist in a sovereign state, free from any
interference of large, core states. Once the Palestinians are able to
establish and solidify a strong internal identity, they can begin to build
their state from the inside out. To assist in their internal development, it
is going to be necessary for Israel to relinquish the lands gained in the
5

Six Days war and allow the Palestinians to return to the 1967 borders.
Once the Palestinians have a geographically united territory, they can
begin to establish a unified, national state. In addition, a solid political
system is going to need to be discussed and negotiated and compromises
are going to have to be made. Perhaps a complete overhaul, of the
already established Palestinian Authority, is necessary for the success of
an independent state to ascertain a legitimate system that is respected
and supported by the people. The restructuring of the political system
will probably be one of the most difficult internal obstacles to
accomplish. The politics and political leaders can not remain as divided
and self serving as they are now. It will be important for the different
political groups to work together to create a unified system. If it remains
separated and fractured, the political leaders will not be legitimized by
the people and they will have a hopeless time moving to the next step of
state development. Once the obstacles of national identity and internal
politics have been addressed, the Palestinians can focus on building their
state infrastructure. The development of roads and schools and natural
resources will lead to a strong economic system. Palestinians can then
focus on a defense system that will protect themselves and their
interests. Concluding their course of internal development, the
Palestinians will then be able to focus on external matters. At that time
they will be able to demonstrate to the world that they, indeed, are a
viable state that can exist on its own and participate on a global stage.
6

CHAPTER 1
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
For decades now, Palestinians have been trying to get back on
their feet and establish a sovereign Palestinian state. This has proved
nearly impossible with Israel’s hegemonic domination supported by the
international community. International groups and countries verbally
condemn Israel for their treatment of the Palestinians, yet no action is
ever taken to stop the Israelis and to support the Palestinians. However,
there are several obstacles, both external and internal, that need to be
addressed by the Palestinians and their political leaders before a
sovereign, legitimate state can be created.

Nation and State Building
Creating a state or building a nation requires the attention of
several different variables. Political Scientists developed a renewed focus
on nation building after World War II as several countries were being
rebuilt and new nations were being established. Nation and state
building theories have suggested that either external factors or internal
factors can stand in the way of establishing a state; either one or the
other or even both. External obstacles can be examined through
Developmental and Dependency theories. Developmental theories do not
focus on the lack of development by a group or territory; instead they
focus on possible solutions using different variables. One variable is a
7

strong democratic political system, suggesting that for a state to develop,
a democratic system is necessary. However, for industrialized,
democratic, capitalist nations to apply their policies on smaller,
undeveloped nations is sufficiently useless. The typical outcome is the
increased repression and exploitation of the people and a textbook
definition of a state cannot be forced on just any developing nation.
Theories of Underdevelopment are closely related as they suggest a
dependency of weaker, underdeveloped satellite states on larger capitalist
states.
Internal obstacles, that developing nations face, are hurdles such
as Nationalism and class structure, which are major themes in
Structuralist theory. Comparativists explain that political development is
co-dependent on Nationalism.1 Nationalism is the promotion of a
citizen’s pride in their nation, it helps foster respect and obedience of
governmental authority and it helps legitimize the government. It is the
collective emotional response that people elicit for their country and it
can be a movement for protecting a state’s freedom and independence
from the face of an external threat. It has played a role in economic,
social, cultural and psychological development. All of the things that
Nationalism represents work smoothly in a democratic government, but
when Nationalism is applied to a state that does not have a strong

Chilcote, Ronald H. Theories of Comparative Politics: The Search for a Paradigm
Reconsidered. Colorado: Westview Press, 1981. Page 99.
1
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European tradition and influence that is when Nationalism can begin to
create all kinds of problems. The “classical” origins of Nationalism are
deeply rooted in European traditions. Over the centuries, several
different takes on Nationalism have been constructed and utilized.
Modern nationalism has been viewed as liberal or republican,
reconstructive, integral, cultural, and religious and secessionist. Each
new wave of nationalism developed as the people in Europe, or the people
controlled by Europe, saw fit. The tradition of Nationalism was taken on
the boats to the Americas where the US was created in a European
image. It is extremely difficult to apply the idea of Nationalism to areas
such as Africa, South America and the Middle East. They do not have a
strong European influence that has emphasized concepts such as
Nationalism. These regions have rich, non-European histories that
make it extremely hard for them to adjust to a phenomenon like
Nationalism. However, can a unified pride and identity of a particular
nation help to solidify and legitimize that nation?
Arab Nationalism is a type of Nationalism that was created by the
Arabs at the turn of the twentieth century. It emerged as a way for
Middle Eastern Arabs to unite over their experiences with imperialism.
Arab Nationalism represented diverse and fragmented ideas that came
from a diverse and fragmented Arab world. It provided Arabs with an
alternate reality, a reality away from the one in which they found
themselves. The process of forming a nationalist self-view among the
9

Arabs began with the adaptation to Near Eastern conditions of the
European concept of patria and patriotism.2 The Middle East is made up
of such a variety of cultures, and each culture has their own unique and
specific history. Arab Nationalism incorporated all of those differences
and reflected the diversity of the people and their cultures. The
foundation of this Nationalism was rooted in the belief that the Arab
world was united by language, history, geography and the ideology that a
new reality was possible for the Arab people. The consistency of this
belief is what has propelled the idea of Arab Nationalism forward and has
helped to homogenize the Arab experience. One of the first hurdles for
the Arabs and their Arab Nationalism was the struggle for political
independence. It was not a success early on as each state was struggling
to identify themselves within the region, while at the same time acting in
the best interest of their country. The Arab-Israeli conflict has become a
major focal point of Arab Nationalism as it is associated with the
intrusion of Western powers into the Middle East.3
The Structuralist perspective perceives that the functions of the
state are determined by the structures of society and not by the people
who hold positions of power. In social sciences, Structuralist theories

Khalidi, Rashid. The Origins of Arab Nationalism. Columbia University Press, 1991.
Page 4.
2

3

Khalidi, Rashid. The Iron Cage: the Story of the Palestinian Struggle for Statehood.
Massachusetts: Beacon Press, 2007. Page 83.
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focus on the all inclusive general significance of the internal systemic
relation of elements and their role in specific events. Two types of
Structuralist theories that lend themselves to state and nation building
are neo-realism and world systems theory. Neo-realism explains that the
international system is the major deciding factor of the developments in
international politics. Immanuel Wallerstein’s world systems theory
describes the inter-relationship between core, semi-periphery and
periphery states. He accounts for the different levels of states, by first
identifying what a state is. The modern state is a sovereign state.
Sovereignty is a concept that was invented in the modern world-system.
Its prima facie meaning is totally autonomous state power.4 Wallerstein
explains how states organize themselves internally and how that can
affect states relationships with one another. The most significant arena
of social action was that which occurred within the boundaries of the
state. Using this premise, many things seemed obvious: States were
sovereign, they also had historical roots. They had economies, political
systems, social norms and structures, and cultural heritages, each of
which could be specified by social scientists. What distinguished one
state from another was its specific combination of these parallel
spheres.5 He explains that the world-economy develops a pattern where

Wallerstein, Immanual. World Systems Analysis: An Introduction. United States: Duke
University Press, 2004. Page 42.

4

5

Wallerstein, Immanual. Page 25.
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state structures are relatively strong in the core areas and relatively weak
in the periphery.6 Dependency theory is a direct off shoot of Wallerstein’s
world systems theory that has been explored in both developed and
developing countries. The theory suggests that poor underdeveloped
states in the periphery are exploited by the developed imperialistic states
of the core. The core states exploit the periphery states to increase their
economic development and gain and maintain wealth. It also argues that
the economic depravation of the periphery states is a direct result of their
integration into the world system.7 Some premises of Dependency
theories are; periphery states provide a home for obsolete technology and
markets for the core states, a state of dependence is perpetuated through
policies and proposals, and when periphery states attempt to resist the
core states, economic sanctions are placed or even military force is used.
However, the world-system is much less reliant on direct politicalmilitary coercion, and more reliant on economic exploitation which is
organized through the production and sale of commodities.8 It is
suggested that this vicious circle can lead to social revolution. In his
Structural theory of Imperialism, Johan Galtung explains that the
relationship between the core and periphery states is at the expense of a

Wallerstein, Immanuel. “The Modern World System.” New York: Academic Press, 1976.
Page 6
6

7

Chilcote, 243.

Chase-Dunn, Christopher K. Global Formation: Structures of the World Economy.
Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1998. Page 204.

8

12

majority of the people in the periphery state and is only in the best
interest of the core state. Hegemonic relations between nations and
other collectivities will not disappear with the disappearance of
imperialism; nor will the end to one type of imperialism (e.g. political, or
economic) guarantee the end to another type of imperialism (e.g.
economic or cultural).9
The case of the Palestinians is unique in that they are struggling
from both internal and external obstacles. Their struggle to self govern is
compounded by the fact that not only are there external complications,
those complications are leading to internal complications as well. In this
particular case, the external obstacles are creating the internal obstacles.
The complexity and diversity of these wide ranging obstacles can better
be explained through the environmental theory. The environmental
theory explains several dynamics of a state, such as the geography,
culture, population, climate and the political geography.

Environmental Theories
Environmental theory explains that geographic and climatic
circumstances influence national characteristics, foreign policies of

Galtung, Johan. “A Structural Theory of Imperialsim.” Journal of Peace Research, Vol.
8, No. 2 (1971). Page 2.

9
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states and state identity.10 The United States and their pursuit of
national land expansion under the widely accepted idea of Manifest
Destiny is an example of how geography influenced a nation and their
characteristics. The US government was able to accomplish their
expansion by nurturing a unified attitude among Americans and
fostering a national concept at a national level. Environmental theory
includes a discussion on political geography, which is the relationship
between politics and geography.11 An examination of political geography
includes factors such as: individuals, government, groups of people, and
social institutions. The environmental factors that are considered when
measuring the political geography are: national and human-created
systems, national resources and urban areas. Political geography is a
concept that goes hand in hand with the current Palestinian situation.
Ultimately it is an internal obstacle that is influenced, at each level, by
an outside external obstacle.
Geopolitics is another aspect of Environmental theory that focuses
on the study of people, the state, and the world as organic units.12 The
state is viewed as a living organism that occupies space, contracts, grows
and eventually dies. The state is then modified to be only an aggregate-

Pfaltzgraff Jr., Robert L. and James E. Dougherty. Contending Theories of
International Relations: A Comprehensive Survey. New York: Longman, 1997. Page
144-145
10

11

Dougherty, Pfaltzgraff, 147

12

Dougherty, Pfaltzgraff, 158
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organism which is forged by moral and spiritual forces.13 What is
people’s relationship to nature? Geopolitics evaluates climate,
topography, and natural resources. It is hypothesized that humans are
in an unending struggle for living space because a state’s land area
indicates that state’s power. Due to this correlation, states make every
effort to expand their borders. This urge to expand causes boundaries to
shift and change all the time, creating conflict between the states. States
are in a relentless struggle for survival.14 Geopolitics has evolved over
the years as a measure of the relationship between geography and power.
Can a state’s geography influence their political power? This question is
addressed in the core-periphery model based on dependency theory.
According to the realist school of thought, the geographic location of
states will condition that state’s political behavior. Both neo-realists and
neo-liberals suggest that human culture and physical features are a
major part of Environmental theory.
Arnold Toynbee, an early twentieth century historian, intensifies
Environmental theory by suggesting that civilizations come into existence
in environments that harbor difficult challenges. Civilizations then
develop a unified force to overcome the difficulty allowing them to move
on to the next challenge. In turn, the subsequent challenge elicits a new

13

Dougherty, Pfaltzgraff, 158

14

Dougherty, Pfaltzgraff, 158
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response or solution that provides the civilization with the tools to
problem solve and advance their community.15 Toynbee’s idea is known
as the challenge-response cycle. The possibilities for a civilization are
potentially infinite, but his theory does not allow for the prediction of
possible obstacles or solutions. Toynbee provides 5 types of challenging
stimuli to support his hypothesis. Two of his stimuli are physical; they
are hard country and new ground. Hard country is a country possessing
a harsh climate, terrain and soil. New ground is the exploration, opening
up, and development of a wilderness into productive land. Toynbee’s last
three stimuli are non-physical; they are, challenges emanating from
another state, continuous external pressure against a state, and a
stimulus of penalization- that is if a state loses the use of a particular
component, it is likely to respond by increasing correspondingly the
efficiency of another component.16 The stimulus of penalization can also
be demonstrated through racial discrimination. Certain classes and
races have suffered for centuries from various forms of penalization
imposed upon them by other classes or races that have had mastery over
them. Penalized classes or races generally respond to this challenge of
being excluded from certain opportunities and privileges by putting forth
exceptional energy and showing exceptional capacity in such directions

Toynbee, Arnold and David Churchill Somerville. A Study of History: Abridgement of
Volumes I-VI, Volume 1. New York: Oxford University Press, 1946. Page 48.
15

16

Dougherty, Pfaltzgraff, 150
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as are left open to them.17 Toynbee notes that an overly severe physical
challenge can hinder a civilization’s development. The Arabian nomad
falls into the latter category.
Harold and Margaret Sprout have made major contributions to
Environmental theory. They have examined the role that geography
plays in examining political behavior by suggesting that most human
activity is affected by the uneven distribution of resources. The
interrelationship of geography, demography, technology and resources
are compared and examined. This examination not only focuses on the
internal, domestic aspects of a state, but how states interact with one
another. The Sprouts assess the environment in its relationship to
human activity. They imply that operation milieu affects human activity
in that, factors can limit individual performance or the outcome of
decisions, based on perceptions of the environment.18 Environmental
factors become related to the attitudes and decisions which comprise a
state's foreign policy only by being perceived and taken into account in
the policy-forming process. The statesman's psycho-logical environment
(that is, his image, or estimate, of the situation, setting, or milieu) may or
may not correspond to the operational environment (in which his

Toynbee, Arnold. A Study of History. New York: Oxford University Press, 1946. Page
572
17

18

Dougherty, Pfaltzgraff, 159
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decisions are executed).19 To strengthen the argument for the
Palestinian people, the application of cognitive behavioralism provides
the assumption that a person consciously responds to the environment
through perception and no other way. Political decisions are based on
what the state leaders’ perception of the environment is.
Resource scarcity and conflict are two major components of
Environmental theories that help demonstrate the relationships between
core and periphery states. The depletion of natural resources can lead to
conflict as states and people become so desperate they resort to violence
to attain them. Nonrenewable resources cause the biggest conflict
because once they are consumed, they are gone. In terms of renewable
resources, water causes the most conflict. Environmental scarcity can
lead to economic depravation and conflict which contributes to civil strife
and increases economic and political pressures on governments, possibly
resulting in a weakening of state legitimacy.20 To compound the issue of
economic development and resource scarcity, the chance of conflict
increases because of their geographic location. Geography, and
specifically the location of political entities in close proximity to each
other, is said to create opportunity for conflict to the extent that states
sharing borders with each other are more likely to engage in conflict than

19 Sprout, Harold and Margaret. “Environmental Factors in the Study of International
Politics”. Sage Publications, Inc. The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 1, No. 4 (Dec.,
1957), pp. 309-328
20 Dougherty, Pfaltzgraff, 164
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are states that are noncontiguous.21 Throughout history, conflict has
been more about territorial issues than political goals. Environmental
theories suggest that a war in one state increases the chances that there
will be war in one or more other states, demonstrating a domino type
effect.

Institution Building
Institution building is an important component in the development
of a state. The internal system of a state relies upon the effectiveness
and efficiency of state institutions. Institutions serve as a link between a
state’s political system and the people of that state. At times institutions
link states to one another and play a major role in the development of a
state. Max Weber argued that states are compulsory associations
claiming control over territories and the people within them.
Administrative, legal, extractive, and coercive organizations are the core
of any state.22 The Weberian perspective suggests that the state must be
considered as more than the “government.” It is the continuous
administrative, legal, bureaucratic and coercive systems that attempt not
only to structure relationships between civil society and public authority

21

Dougherty, Pfaltzgraff, 165

Skocpol, Theda. Peter B. Evans and Dietrich Rueschemeyer. Bringing the State Back
In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research. Australia: Cambridge University Press,
1985. Page 3.
22
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in a polity, but also to structure many crucial relationships within civil
society as well.23 The institutional structure of a state can influence
private entrepreneurial groups and their role in the future development
of the state. As long as the state provides a stable frame of rules so that
the returns from investment are predictable, private agents will do the
rest.24 Economic and financial institutions play a significant role in the
development and subsequent success of a state. It is quite likely that
economies that are rich choose or can afford better institutions. Perhaps
more important, economies that are different for a variety of reasons will
differ both in their institutions and in their income per capita.25 The
state’s ability to support markets and capitalist accumulation depend on
the bureaucracy being a corporately coherent entity in which individuals
see furtherance of corporate goals as the best means of maximizing their
individual self-interest. The concentration of expertise in the
bureaucracy through meritocratic recruitment and the provision of
opportunities for long-term career rewards are also central to the
bureaucracy’s effectiveness.26 It is also beneficial to observe the

23

Skocpol, 7
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Evans, Peter B. Embedded Autonomy. New Jersey: Princeton, 1995. Page 31

Robinson, James A. Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson. “The Colonial Origins of
Political Development: An Empirical Investigation.” The American Economic Review.
2001, June. Page 2.
25

Evans, Peter B. “Predatory, Developmental, and Other Apparatuses: A Comparative
Political Economy Perspective on the Third World State.” Sociological Forum, Vol. 4, No.
26
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institution structures and activities of states and how they
unintentionally influence the formations of groups and the political
capacities, ideas and demands of various sectors of society.27 Social
scientists have spent the last thirty years trying to maneuver around the
idea of a neo-utilitarian system and its theories on institution building.
If historically derived institutional patterns define individual interests
and constrain the way they are pursued, then “one size fits all” diagnoses
will not work.28 Measuring a state in comparative historical terms could
be beneficial in that it is a tradition that takes institutions seriously.29
However, returning to Weber’s discussion, imposing different policies on
a separate apparatus without changing the structure of the state will not
work. Real changes in policies and behavior depend on the possibility of
erecting new state structures.30 The relationship between a state’s
institutions and its society can be either helpful or detrimental to the
development of that state. It is social capital built in the interstices
between state and society that keeps growth on track.31 The mutual

4, Special Issue: Comparative National Development: Theory and Facts for the 1990s
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development of a state’s political system and institutions combine with
the certain aspects of a society, such as economic development, leads to
the healthy development of that state. When public agents and citizens
have sufficiently different (but equally necessary) kinds of inputs, they
can produce more efficiently by combining their efforts than by either
producing everything privately or everything publicly.32 If the two are
interconnected in a way that is not conducive to the success of the state,
it can prevent the state from making any positive changes. Some states
are weak because diffused fragments of society have stayed strong,
retaining at the local level the ability to frustrate state actions.33
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CHAPTER 2
PALESTINIAN HISTORY
The Canaanites and Phillistines
As early as the third millennium BCE, Palestine existed and was
inhabited by the Canaanites. Like most other civilizations during that
time, the Canaanites existed in several organized city-states, one of
which was Jericho being the best known. Around the second millennium
BCE, during the 14th century, the Canaanite city-states were invaded by
several groups, two of which were the Hebrews and the Philistines. The
Hebrews, together, united several different tribes and called themselves
Israelites. They then attempted to gain control of Palestine, but were
unable to conquer and defeat the Philistines. The Philistines settled in
the southern part of Palestine and controlled the Canaanite city of
Jerusalem. Around 1050 BCE, the Philistines, with their iron weapons
and well organized military, fought and defeated the Israelites. During
the first millennium BCE, King David of Israel came into Palestine and
defeated the Philistines. Over the next couple hundred of years, the
Israelites became internally divided and were conquered by the
Assyrians. Palestine’s Assyrian domination ended with Alexander the
Great of Macedonia and the destruction of the Second Temple by the
Romans in 70 CE and the formation of the Jewish diaspora after the
formation of the autonomous Jewish kingdom of the Hasmoneans, who
broke free of the Hellenistic kingdoms. In 313 CE, Palestine became a
23

focus of Roman Emperor Constantine after his conversion to
Christianity. Jerusalem and Palestine became a focus as both a
Christian and Jewish holy site and became a major destination for
pilgrimage. By 638 CE, Palestine was invaded and conquered by Muslim
Arabs who took control of Jerusalem and Palestine. The takeover of
Jerusalem was peaceful as the Arabs showed mercy to those they
conquered and the area came to be known as Filastin. This would begin
an era of Muslim control that would last the next 1300 years.
The Muslim Arabs were interested in Palestine in part because it
was known that the Prophet Mohammad had initially indicated
Jerusalem as the first qibla, or direction that Muslims face when they
pray. Over time, Jerusalem became the third holiest city in Islam. The
Muslims generally did not force their religion or beliefs on the
Palestinians once they had taken control and it would be centuries before
a majority of the people in Palestine began to convert to Islam. The
remaining Christian and Jewish Palestinians were granted autonomous
control of their communities and allowed to practice their religion
because they were viewed as “People of the Book” [ahl al-kitab]. The
Ottoman Turks overran Palestine in 1516 CE and remained in control
there until 1917. During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the
Ottoman Empire had one of the most powerful militaries in the world.
Due to their military strength, the Ottoman Empire entered into foreign
negotiations and economic agreements with an attitude of superiority.
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However, from the end of the seventeenth century onward, they struggled
to find their place in a newly changing world as the international
dynamic shifted around them. The Ottomans were unable to modernize
the Empire’s institutions as quickly as other states and they became
increasingly prone to external interventions by outside powers. The
foreign and economic agreements, or Capitulations, that they had made
with other countries were now being exploited and abused.34 Eventually,
the Ottoman military became weak and after the Great War they suffered
a series of defeats. After World War I, the empire collapsed and was
replaced by the Turkish Republic, which renounced its claim to the
Ottoman Arab provinces.

Zionism
In the decades leading up to the fall of the Ottoman Empire, a
fervent Jewish ideology began to take root in some parts of Europe that
came to center on the land of Palestine. Ever since the expulsion of large
parts of the Jewish population of Palestine by the Romans after 70 CE,
some Jews had kept alive the messianic idea of returning to the Holy
Land. For the purposes of this study, the term “Zionism” refers to the
ideological belief among Jewish communities that God has destined the
Jewish people to re-create the fallen kingdom of ancient Israel, otherwise
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referred to as Zion; and “Zionists” are those who believe that Jews have a
right to a modern national home in historic Palestine—with the claim to
this land based on the existence of a Jewish kingdom dating from
roughly three thousand years ago. These beliefs would later receive
further justification from perceptions of abiding anti-Semitism and by the
trauma of the Holocaust.35
Although the concept of Zionism was always prevalent in Jewish
life, it was never well-organized, planned or put into action with any
lasting success. But the growth of modern nationalist ideas in
nineteenth-century Europe would change all of that. In Europe, and
particularly in Eastern Europe, Jewish communities faced discrimination
from both their governments and other communal populations.36 They
were denied entry into certain professions, universities and state
employment. Zionism offered a focus and escape and this Zionism that
they began focusing on was not the old religious Zionism that had been
passed down generation to generation, this was a new political Zionism
that was inspired by both religion and modern concepts of nationalism.37
In 1884, pro-Zionist Jews coordinated themselves under the name Lovers
of Zion. They organized for the sole purpose of focusing their efforts on
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building a Jewish settlement in Palestine. From the beginning, the new
political Zionism did look at Palestine as a possible home for their future
Jewish state. A booklet by Leo Pinsker was one of the first publications
that verbalized the new Zionist agenda. Pinsker explained that antiSemitism was so deeply rooted in European culture and society, that no
matter what steps European governments took to change the laws, it
would never make any difference.38 He urged European Jews to stop
waiting for Western culture to change and instead put their efforts
towards the establishment of an independent Jewish state. However, it
is important to know that Pinsker did not insist that this new Jewish
state be established in Palestine. Although Pinsker urged young
European Jews to establish an independent Jewish state, the idea of
Zionism was still unorganized and did not have a strong leadership or
sense of direction. However, it would take the western European figure
of Theodor Herzl to organize the Zionist ideology and mold it into an
international movement. Herzl agreed with Pinsker’s notion that antiSemitism was deeply rooted in European society, and he created an
ideological blueprint for a more explicitly defined form of political
Zionism. His main argument in his work, The Jewish State, was that the
Jewish people constituted a nation but lacked a political state to go with
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it.39 He explained that the only way for the Jewish people to escape
persecution was to create an independent sovereign state. Like Pinsker,
Herzl did not insist that the new Jewish state be established in Palestine,
but he was. After the hundreds of years that a Jewish state had been
discussed, Herzl was the first to define a clear political objective and
maneuver the Zionist agenda into a coherent, unified movement.40
However, Herzl knew, during his lifetime, that the Zionist objective would
not be achieved without the support of a Great power that would be
willing to financially assist in their establishment.

British Mandate of Palestine
When the Ottoman Empire decided to join World War I on the side
of Germany with the Central Powers, the Allied Powers (Great Britain,
France and Russia) began discussing how their territories would be
divided up among themselves in the event of an Allied victory.
Eventually, this discussion came to be intertwined with the politics of
Zionism and its perceived role in influencing the outcome of the war.
Some in the British government thought that the governments of Allied
powers like Russia were being influenced by Jewish groups. Thus, they
worried that if Germany came out in support of an independent Jewish
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state, they might gain enough support to swing the war in favor of the
Central powers. Great Britain felt that if it could offer an indication of
support for the Zionist agenda, then they could retain the support of
influential Jewish members throughout the world. Although it is now
known that this would not have been a decisive factor, it is important to
understand what drove the British policy at the time.
Zionist spokesmen such as Chaim Weizmann in London helped to
influence the British government in this direction by suggesting that an
independent Jewish state would serve the imperial interests of Great
Britain. There was no question in the minds of early Zionists that their
desire to create a Jewish state in Palestine could succeed only were it to
appeal to powerful forces within Western nations, especially Britain.41 If
Britain sponsored a Jewish state in Palestine once the Ottoman Empire
lost its sovereignty over the land, it would prevent France from taking
control of that land to serve their own imperial interests. All of these
factors contributed to the eventual decision to extend British support to
the Zionist agenda in Palestine. In November of 1917, British foreign
secretary Arthur Balfour and his cabinet approved and supported a
Jewish Zionist agenda. The Balfour Declaration supported a Jewish
state in Palestine, but at the same time tried to protect the non-Jewish
communities already established there. While it was a success for
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Zionist Jews, the Balfour Declaration was full of contradictions and was
extremely confusing.42
Due to the Balfour Declaration, Palestine’s experience after the fall
of the Ottoman Empire was much different from that of the other Arab
territories. The Palestinian Arab notables that were trying to establish
and maintain control of Palestine were wary of Great Britain and their
support of Zionism.43 At that time, the focus became the issue that there
was a relatively small territory that had been inhabited by Arabs for
some 1200 years and it was promised, by another state, as the national
home to another group of people, a majority of whom were Askenazi Jews
from Europe. The Palestinian notables resisted working with Great
Britain and their mandate because they felt that any acceptance of the
British imperial rule would be misconstrued as Arab support for the
Balfour Declaration and that it would violate their right to selfdetermination they were going to achieve out of the Versailles process.
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The White Paper
As Jewish immigration began to swell and Jewish settlements
became more dominant in Palestine, the tensions rose to violent levels
between the Arabs and Zionist Jews. With the outbreak of disturbances
and riots by the end of the 1920s, Great Britain began investigating the
conflicts with the formation of the Shaw Commission. In the fall of 1929,
Great Britain sent this commission to Palestine to investigate the
troubles of their mandate and find out why there was so much violence
in the region. Shaw concluded that there was a widespread fear among
the displaced Arab communities that the increasing Jewish immigration
would create a Jewish-dominated Palestine.44 Shaw recommended that
the Jewish immigration be reined in by the British government and that
Arabs should no longer be evicted in the name of land transfers.
The British government chose to ignore Shaw’s findings and
decided instead to send another commission into Palestine. In the
summer of 1930, the Hope-Simpson Commission visited Palestine and
presented their findings to the British government in what was referred
to as the Passfield White Paper. The White Paper reminded Great Britain
of its responsibility to both the Arab and Jewish communities as a
mandatory power. It suggested that one of Great Britain’s objectives
should be the establishment of an independent Palestine by 1949, which

44

Cleveland, 257

31

would include a discussion with the League of Nations to help terminate
the mandate. It was expressed that the independent state be one in
which Arabs and Jews would share in government as to ensure the
essential interests of each community. The White Paper also discussed a
necessary transitional period from the mandate into a state of
independence.45 However, the recommendations suggested in the While
Papers were very clear about the involvement of both Jews and Arabs in
the creation of Palestine’s political system. If the state was not ready for
full independent control within the suggested time frame, the White
Papers explained that both Jewish and Arab heads of state would work
cooperatively with Great Britain to achieve that end.
In regard to immigration, it was set forth that Jewish immigration
to the region needed to be facilitated under suitable conditions.46 In
theory, Jewish immigration to Palestine was not to exceed the local
economic capacity or become a burden upon the people of Palestine as a
whole.47 The White Paper suggested that land be set aside for all of the
displaced Arabs and noted that Palestine had a limited economic
capacity; therefore, restrictions needed to be made on Jewish
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immigration.48 However, it soon became clear that the provisions
outlined in the White Paper would not be met. When Zionists were made
aware of the White Paper, they mounted a large, concerted effort to have
the document withdrawn altogether. By 1931, they had succeeded in
their efforts and the White Paper was stricken from record. This, in turn,
demonstrated to the Palestinian Arabs the power and sway that the
Zionists had over the British government at their own expense.
Essentially, the White Paper was the beginning of the end. The British
Mandate began to spiral down as they would soon no longer have any
control over the situation in Palestine.
In April of 1936 riots broke out in Palestine that led to what has
been historically referred to as the Arab Revolt. The Arab Palestinians
began to boycott Jewish goods and businesses and they made demands
of Great Britain. These demands included an end to Jewish immigration,
transfers of land to Jewish owners and a new general government. The
conflict and violence continued sporadically for the next three years. The
revolt ended with the White Paper of 1939. The MacDonald White Paper
was a policy paper in which the idea of partitioning the British Mandate
of Palestine was abandoned in favor of Jews and Arabs sharing one
government. It called for the creation of a unified Palestinian State. Even
though the White Paper stated that it was committed to the Balfour
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Declaration, it imposed very substantial limits on both Jewish
immigration and their ability to purchase land. In terms of the status
quo, it was a significant defeat for the Jewish side who viewed this as a
great betrayal of British promises for a Jewish National Homeland in
Palestine. However, due to impending World War II, opposition from all
sides, and the fall of the Chamberlain government, forced the paper into
the background. Israel would declare itself an independent state before
the paper could ever be reviewed again.
In the late 1940s, the Zionist movement, that was attempting to
establish an independent Jewish state of Israel, became wary and tired of
British control. Although the Zionist movement had needed the initial
support of a powerful state, like Great Britain, they were beginning to feel
limited and betrayed by the control of the British government and they
wanted to move out from under their shadow. Moreover, it had always
been part of the Zionist goals of self-determination to become an
independent sovereign state free from the control of any country. Thus,
Jewish groups began actively undertaking acts of rebellion aimed at
weakening British control over the mandate of Palestine. By February of
1947, Britain realized that they had lost control of the situation in
Palestine and they requested an intervention from the United Nations.
The UN put together a committee that was in charge of investigating the
situation in Palestine known as UNSCOP, or the United Nations Special
Committee on Palestine, which was composed of delegates from 11
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different nations.49 They arrived in Jerusalem in June of 1947 and spent
five weeks investigating the situation of ferment in Palestine. As part of
its conclusions, the recommendations that UNSCOP produced suggested
the immediate termination of the British mandate and a declaration of
the independence of Palestine. However, the means by which to
implement an independent Palestine was a divisive subject among the
members of the committee. Some felt that Palestine should be formed
into a unitary federal state, while others felt that a two-state solution,
one Arab and one Jewish, was the only viable option. A majority of
members did conclude that Jerusalem should be categorized as an
international city, belonging to no one.50 The Zionist leaders initially
favored the report, while the Arab leaders rejected its conclusions.
Zionist leaders, including pro-Zionist member states of the UN such as
the United States, favored the report because it eliminated the British
mandate and would assure the Zionists a fighting chance at achieving a
sovereign state. Great Britain, meanwhile, did not even wait for the
UNSCOP reports to be released before they withdrew from Palestine
entirely. Due to the absence of the British and their refusal to assist in
the UN partition plan, Palestine was thrown into a state of chaos before
any attempt to implement the UNSCOP recommendations could take
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place. Events on the ground turned into a violent race to see who could
claim the most land for their group. Since there was no official transfer
of power from Great Britain to any sovereign entity as they withdrew
from Palestine, the struggle for supremacy between the Arab and Jewish
communities boiled over. Zionist leaders declared an independent state
of Israel and explicitly moved in favor of the two-state solution.51 It was
immediately recognized by both the United States and the Soviet Union.

The War of 1948
Around the end of World War II, Arabs made up an absolute
majority of the population in Palestine and owned close to ninety percent
of the country’s privately owned land. With the outbreak of the first ArabIsraeli War in 1947 and 1948, more than half of the country’s Arab
majority, probably over 750,000 people were expelled from or forced to
flee the areas that became part of the state of Israel. About half were
obliged to depart from their homes before the formal establishment of
Israel and the entry of several Arab armies into Palestine on May 15; the
rest left after that date.52 The state of Israel was being established in
Palestine because European Jews claimed that the land was the site of a
Hebrew Kingdom, during the first millennium B.C., which they had
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ancient rights to including the role it played in their self-determination.
In addition, they wanted to escape discrimination in Europe. By the
spring of 1948, the largest Arab cities had been taken over by the Zionist
militias that would later be reconstituted as the Israeli military, and
those Palestinians who had fled were turned into refugees. Often, the
Palestinians that had fled were the most educated, and had a greater
share of wealth and status in their former society. Although they were
displaced and reduced to refugees, they were only a fraction of the Arabs
affected by the establishment of the new state. The outlying villages and
urban areas that were homes to millions of Arabs became the new homes
to the displaced Arabs who were forced to move out of the cities when the
Israeli army came in and destroyed most of their homes.
In late 1948, after the declaration of Israel as an independent
state, the surrounding Arab states invaded Israel. Egypt, Syria,
Lebanon, Transjordan and Iraq invaded Israel under the idea that they
were supporting a unified Arab region.53 However, the reality quickly
became apparent that they also entered Israel for their own mutuallyexclusive and state-specific reasons. The underlying rivalry between the
Arab states, paired with a lack of military resources, low numbers of
trained soldiers and disunity among the Arab combatant states allowed
for a decisive Israeli victory. In part due to the confusion surrounding
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this complex early stage of the Arab-Israeli conflict, Israel denied for
years that they had any influence in the migration of the Palestinians;
they claimed that the Palestinian leadership had voluntarily withdrawn
to join with the Arab states. However, it has been successfully proven in
more recent historiography of the conflict that Israel did indeed threaten,
coerce and forcibly expel Palestinian communities from their homes in
many cases.

The Arab Nations and the Palestinian Issue
As a result of the Israeli fight for independence, the existence of
Israel was not acknowledged or welcomed by any neighboring states.
The other Arab states of the Middle East felt that Israel was an extension
of imperialistic Western culture and that Israel planned to suppress Arab
culture and aid in the cultural corruption by the long arm of the Western
powers.54 In the following decade, the gradual decline of European
colonial power saw the Arab states move toward defining their
sovereignty and acting in the best interest of their individual states.
They had no interest in playing a role in the Cold War that the United
States and the Soviet Union had created to further advance their own
agendas. However, pragmatism soon dictated that they would be unable
to avoid it entirely.
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Around 1954, Egypt came under the authoritarian rule of Gamal
‘Abd al-Nasir, who advocated a new approach to Egyptian foreign policy.
He was a leading figure in the Pan-Arab movement aimed at building
confidence in the Arab states of the Middle East and moving out of the
shadow of the imperialistic West. ‘Abd al-Nasir was able to burnish his
pan-Arab and anti-imperial credentials by forcing Great Britain to
withdraw from the Suez Canal Zone in Egypt. After long, structured
negotiations, Great Britain withdrew from the Suez Canal. This was an
example to the Middle East and the rest of the world that negotiations
were possible without having the alignment with a great power. While
the Arab states celebrated ‘Abd al-Nasir’s victory, the European states
were furious. In part, however, the Egyptian victory was tied to the fact
that the Baghdad Pact was being sold, simultaneously, to Middle Eastern
states by the United States with the idea that their governments would
accept military and financial aid from the US in an exchange for
ideological alignment with US and Western thought.55 Egypt ultimately
rejected the Baghdad Pact, however, and ‘Abd al-Nasir was able to
convince Jordan and Syria to reject the pact also. ‘Abd al-Nasir firmly
believed that the Arab states did not need imperial alliances or Western
influences to achieve a successful sovereign state. In addition, it should
be noted that since the creation of Israel, many of the Palestinian
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refugees had been forced to the Egyptian-Israeli border and several
incidents had taken place that had reminded the Egyptian government
that they did not have a military that could match that of Israel’s. They
realized that they would need newer weapons to advance their military,
and previously, when Egypt had approached the United States for this
assistance, they were turned away because of their unwillingness to
cooperate with the Baghdad Pact.
Still in need of more updated weapons and newer technology,
Egypt turned to Czechoslovakia to purchase the weapons—which was a
thinly-veiled move toward the Soviets in western eyes. Egypt entered
into a large arms agreement with them in exchange for Egyptian cotton.
The rest of the world viewed this agreement as Egypt’s alignment with
Soviet Union.56
Moreover, at this time Egypt was also aware that they needed more
money to help in the development of their natural resources to sustain
their economy. Egypt decided to implement an idea that had been talked
about for some time by deciding to build another dam across the Nile.
This idea was beneficial to the Egyptians because it would demonstrate
to the world that they had the skill and capacity to implement an
ambitious and sophisticated development project. It would also allow for
an increase in the amount of land that could be irrigated, provide electric
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power and supply the entire country.57 The only roadblock to this plan
was the massive funding that was required to make it possible. Egypt
was forced to seek financial assistance.
They received an offer to have the project funded by the United
States and Great Britain, but both attached provisions and conditions to
the aid. While Egypt was considering the offer, the United States
changed its mind and rescinded its offer of financial assistance
altogether. ‘Abd al-Nasir responded with a dramatic move. On July 26,
1956, Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal and declared that the money
made off of the canal would go to fund Egyptian projects the West
refused to sponsor. The Suez Canal had been built by the Egyptian ruler
Khedive Isma‘IL in the nineteenth century, but financed by European
banks and it was owned and operated by the French. ‘Abd al-Nasir tried
to resolve this lingering problem by offering financial compensation for
the Canal. The Western states reactions to his unilateral action were
that of fury and hostility.
In the fall of 1956, international conferences were convened to
determine a resolution that would be acceptable to all parties, but Great
Britain, France and Israel had secretly decided upon their own resolution
to the Suez Canal crisis.58 In late October, Israel launched a military
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attack into Sinai, and a couple of days later, Great Britain bombed Egypt
to allow Israeli troops to advance to the Suez Canal itself. France also
supported the Israeli attack until a UN-sponsored cease fire was reached.
All three states were condemned by the international community,
particularly by the United States and the Soviet Union. All three were
forced to withdraw from Egypt because of the terrific pressure to do so on
the part of both the United States and Soviet Union. While the Security
Council did not condemn the tripartite invasion of Egypt because France
and Great Britain, as permanent council members, enjoyed power of
veto59, strong pressure from the United States soon forced Israel’s
withdrawal from the Gaza Strip as well. Even then, Israel would not leave
Egypt for another four months and a UN emergency force had to be
placed in Gaza to act as a buffer between Israel and Egypt. The entire
situation reinforced the Arab notion that Israel was part of a continued
European colonial agenda and that they would attempt to reverse gains
made by Arab states at any cost.

The Six-Day War
Since the establishment of the state in 1948, as a result of various
conflicts, Israel had expanded its control into various border regions of
the surrounding Arab nations. This was a continual source of conflict
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and hostility with its surrounding neighbors. Israel had also developed a
raging insecurity over the possibility of a unified Arab nation and the
military threat that would come with it. In the meantime, the Palestinian
refugees that were forced to live in camps on the Israeli borders were
becoming increasingly frustrated by the lack of attention to their plight.
Since the collapse of Palestine, the Palestinian refugees had been
practically forgotten. One of the most noteworthy conflicts between
Israel and the wider Arab world that decisively turned the balance of
power in favor of Israel was that of the Six-Day War.
The Six-Day War grew out of the instability that marked the
armistice lines and state borders that had been drawn to end the fighting
over the Palestinian land between Israel and the surrounding Arab states
in the 1940s. By 1967, Israel’s attempts to violate those lines and
agreements had been numerous. Israel would not honor the armistice
line with Syria as Israel felt that shelling from the Golan Heights was
threatening and they made several public overtures that military force
would be used, if necessary, to get what they wanted. Syria turned to
Egypt for help and both states remained in constant communication with
the UN. In May of 1967, as a response to the full mobilization of the
Israeli military, Egypt announced that it would close the Straits of Tiran
to Israeli-flag vessels and to any vessels carrying strategic goods to Israel.
Egypt said its purpose was to prevent Israel from transporting strategic
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goods it might use in an attack on Syria. It cited Israel’s threats against
Syria and the presumed Israeli troop buildup facing Syria.60
On June 5, Israel responded to the Egyptian action by launching a
surprise attack on Egypt, marked by a simultaneous entry into the
Palestinian area of the Gaza Strip.61 This culminated in the complete
victory of the Israeli forces on all fronts by June 11. Jordan attacked
Israel in response to the attack on Egypt and claimed their right of
collective self-defense under the UN charter. Israel did launch attacks on
both Jordan and Syria and with the help of the United States, they
swiftly defeated Egypt. Within days Israel had also taken control of the
West Bank, the other Palestinian occupied land, in addition to the Gaza
Strip. After taking control of the West Bank, Israel renamed the area
around Jerusalem, Judea and the northern sector as Samaria. The
Israeli government granted individual Israelis permission to purchase
and develop the land. The Master Plan to incorporate the West Bank into
Israel aimed to disperse maximally large Jewish population in areas of
high settlement priority, using small national inputs and in a relatively
short period by using the settlement potential of the West Bank to
achieve the incorporation [of the West Bank] into the Israeli national
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system.62 Although most of the international focus was on the conflict
with the surrounding Arab nations, the occupation of the Palestinian
land was a major catalyst for the increasingly agitated Palestinian
refugees.
Once Israel had control, Prime Minister Eshkol explained that the
new areas would remain occupied for security reasons: “Be under no
illusion that the State of Israel is prepared to return to the situation that
reigned up to a week ago…The position that existed until now shall never
again return”.63 With the Cold War in full swing, an escalating situation
in Vietnam, and the social discord going on in the United States in the
forms of war protests and Civil Rights movements, Israel’s oppression of
the Palestinians did not achieve high-priority status in the international
community, and when it was addressed, it did not take precedence over
other global issues going on at the time. The first anti-Israeli uprising
occurred immediately following the Israeli victory and occupation in June
1967. Subsequently, in 1977 a victory for the Likud party made the
Israeli government and public much more aggressive about the Jewish
settlement issue in the occupied territories. As civil-disobedience
campaigns in the occupied territories devolved into rebellion in Gaza, the
Israeli army stepped in, forcefully suppressed the demonstrators, and

62

Quigley, 175

63

Quigley, 179

45

restored order.64 The defeat in the Six-Day War and the events that
followed saw Palestinians attempting to find their own voice in all of the
change that had occurred. Up until this point, their voice had largely
been bound into the wider pan-Arab nationalist project and they needed
new avenues to seek a resolution to their expulsion from their homes
twenty years before.

Israel and the Palestinian Issue
By 1986, Yitzhak Rabin was Israel’s Defense Minister and Yitzhak
Shamir was Israel’s Prime Minister, and together they implemented a
plan referred to as the “Iron Fist” policy which toughened the treatment
of Palestinian demonstrators. During the Israeli elections of 1984 and
1988, a sufficient number of smaller minor political groups won enough
seats in the Israeli Knesset to prevent either of the large parties from
obtaining a workable majority in the government. The two major Israeli
political parties remained the Labor Party and Likud Party. As a result,
the two parties were forced to work together under a new National Unity
government. In reality, the elections created a total paralysis of the
Israeli political system because the two parties have such opposing views
and agendas. The Labor Party remains in favor of territorial compromise
with the Palestinians, whereas the Likud party continues to be fiercely
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opposed to relinquishing any control of the West Bank or Gaza Strip.
During this time, the Israeli government focused on the construction of
new Jewish settlements in Palestinian controlled areas, and adopted new
measures of separating and isolating Palestinians in their communities.
These policies were marked by Israeli government confiscation of Arab
lands and the arrest and detention of Palestinians suspected of
participating in political activism. The new policies required Palestinians
to carry ID cards and pay specific taxes for the simplest of acts, such as
crossing the border to go to work or obtain licenses. The Israeli acts
heightened Palestinians awareness of their occupied status. Fearing
their eradication as a political and social unit, the Palestinians, provoked
by a relatively minor incident, rose against their Israeli occupiers.65
In December of 1987, an Israeli military tank hit a truck on its way
to the Gaza Strip, with four Palestinian workers in it, and all four men
were killed. This event triggered an outpouring of rage against all the
oppression endured by the Palestinians that came to be called the first
Palestinian Intifada. The Intifadah, which means “uprising” or “shaking
off,” for the first time drew world attention to the Arab-Israeli conflict and
to the plight of the long-forgotten Palestinians living in the Israelioccupied territories.66 Palestinians gathered by the thousands to protest
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the incident. The Israeli military responded by shooting and killing
several Palestinian protestors and the result was widespread revolt
among the Palestinians. It was the uprising of the Palestinians against
the Israeli occupation. It demanded worldwide attention as to the impact
of the Israeli occupation and its effects on the Palestinian people. Images
of rock-throwing Palestinians confronting Israeli military hardware
proved to be a very effective message that demonstrated Palestinian
willingness to oppose Israeli activities against all odds, which did away
with the idea that the problem was going to go away of its own accord.
At first the rebellion was spontaneous, but as it gathered
momentum in both Gaza and the West Bank, the Palestinians came to
create an underground leadership called the Unified National Leadership.
The UNL began organizing the uprising while, at the same time,
supporting the PLO. The PLO maintained its support as most
Palestinians remained loyal to the organization and its agenda. Using its
position as an umbrella organization, the PLO invited Islamist groups to
join the uprising. Islamists focused on local masjids, schools, colleges,
and universities, where Muslim clerics and teachers taught Palestinian
youth a politically motivated activist Islamic message. Islamism had
been growing since the 1970s because of the outcome of revolutions in
both Iran and Lebanon. The Palestinians actually felt like they had a
chance at creating their own state and moving out from the oppressive
shadow of the Israeli government.
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However, as the uprising gained popularity, other organizations
began forming as rivals to the UNL and PLO. The most significant
opposition was that of the Islamic Resistance Movement, known more
commonly as, Hamas. As an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas
was composed of Palestinian refugees and young college-educated
Palestinians. They began to compete with the UNL for the loyalty and
support of the Palestinian people.
A problem with the Intifada was that although the PLO was the
organization in control, it encompassed several different groups who did
not always see eye-to-eye on tactics or strategy. There was no unity or
cohesion among the different Islamist groups, for instance. Their lack of
solidarity made it impossible for them to fully unite all of the
Palestinians. Moreover, in the wake of the First Intifada, a new major
international obstacle faced the Palestinians in the form of the outbreak
of the Gulf War. Although the initial intensity of the uprising had faded,
and the Palestinian people were still struggling with its meaning, the Gulf
War promptly shifted all international attention away from the
Palestinians and the Arab-Israeli conflict toward Iraq and the Gulf states.
Any international sympathies that the Palestinians had created were now
subsumed into the Gulf War and its politics.
Arafat and the PLO came out in support of Saddam Husayn and
his invasion of Kuwait, which was a very unpopular international
position at that time. Islamist support for Hussein, however, represented
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no love for the Iraqi dictator’s pan-Arabism or Arab nationalism; it
represented a more intrinsic rejection of Western intervention in the
ummah and an attack on “the presence of foreign troops in Saudi
Arabia,” which defiled “the holiest land for Islam.”67 While the rest of the
world was focused on the conflict in the Gulf, the Intifada, meanwhile,
increasingly stagnated. Before the crisis, the uprising’s impact had been
receding, and with the outbreak of this new crisis it was eclipsed, though
it never permanently died out.
The defeat and weak political position of the Palestinians only
increased the conflict within the Palestinian community after the end of
the Gulf War. The major obstacle facing the Palestinians, from this point
forward, became their lack of unity and solidarity. Corruption in the
Palestinian leadership has not helped in overcoming this disadvantage,
in particular Yasser Arafat’s unwillingness to share power or confront
growing corruption within the ranks the PLO. Arafat’s increasing
autocratic behavior did not allow for the best possible political outcomes
for the Palestinians. Arafat brooked no opposition from the elected
Palestinian Legislative Council, refused for years to sign a Basic Law
(meant to serve as a transitional constitution) that it had passed, bullied
the legislators, and generally established the unfortunate precedent of
serious imbalances between the powers of the executive and legislative
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branches.68 The lack of sovereignty, absence of concrete law,
government corruption and continued conflict discouraged any outside
investment in Palestinian areas, which perpetuated the pattern of
dependency on external sources for financial support.

The Oslo Peace Accords
The role of the Oslo Peace Accords has contributed enormously to
the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, despite its organization
as a foundation of peace between them. It was created as a framework in
which Israel would trade land for peace and negotiate a final "divorce"
between the two communities. In theory, Oslo envisaged the Israelis'
progressively transferring portions of the occupied West Bank and Gaza
Strip to the control of an interim body called the Palestinian Authority
(PA), the elections for which would include Arafat's previously banned
Palestine Liberation Organization. The Palestinian Authority would
guarantee Israel's security by clamping down on terrorism, as both sides
prepared their people for a final agreement involving a mutual
recognition of each other's claims to Middle Eastern land that would once
have been unthinkable.69 The Oslo process had enemies on both sides:
Israeli right-wingers led by Netanyahu opposed the very principle of
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trading land for peace and vowed to resist the surrender of any territory
over which the Israeli flag flew; whereas Islamic fundamentalist
Palestinians rallied around the Hamas movement to denounce a peace
agreement that would involve Palestinian and Arab acceptance of Israel's
right to exist on what was once Palestinian land.70 The result was that
the Oslo Peace process and U.S. involvement in it has actually hindered
any Palestinian progress in creating an autonomous state. Instead, it
has only given Israel more time to continue occupying Palestinian
territory and building Jewish settlements. The growing failure of the
Oslo Peace Accords fueled support for rejectionist Palestinian groups
such as Hamas, into taking a more aggressive and violent strategy
toward Israel. Many Palestinians in the Israeli-occupied territories and
in the diaspora saw the Oslo Peace Process and the Arafat-Rabin
handshake as a raw deal because Palestinians are worse off today then
they were in 1993. The Arafat-Rabin peace agreements brought new
recruits into the ranks of Revolutionary Islamist Palestinian
organizations such as Hamas and the Islamic Jihad.71
At the Oslo Peace Process, in Washington D.C., Yasser Arafat was
there representing the Palestinian people through his position as the
leader of the PLO and the Israeli Prime Minister, Yitzhak Rabin, was
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representing the state of Israel. Rabin committed Israel to the
discontinuation of building Jewish settlements in the Occupied
Territories. This was a commitment that many Israelis were not willing
or prepared to make, and when Benjamin Netanyahu became Prime
Minister shortly thereafter, he violated the agreement and resumed
building and expanding Jewish settlements. On the other hand, the Oslo
Peace process demonstrated to the world how unprepared and illequipped the PLO was to negotiate with Israel for their independent
state. This has been a problem that has plagued Palestinians with their
international negotiations from the beginning. In regards to the Oslo
Accords, it became particularly acute at the moment when the PLO
leadership in 1992-93 in effect took negotiations with Israel out of the
hands of the relatively competent delegation of generally respected
figures from the occupied territories and others from the Palestinian
diaspora that they had chosen and sent to Washington. Instead, they
placed it instead in the hands of the team of loyal PLO officials that they
appointed to negotiate the Oslo Accords, while calling all the shots from
Tunis.72 Had a more competent, less corrupt group of Palestinian
leaders attended that Oslo Peace Process, perhaps the Israel and the
United States would not have gotten away with as much as they did. As
a result of U.S. involvement in the Oslo Peace process, and their
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unwavering support for Israel, the Peace process only addressed minor
issues that existed between Israel and the PLO. The United States and
Israel purposefully left major issues, such as Palestinian sovereignty,
Jerusalem, Palestinian statehood and refugees, off the table for
discussion during the entirety of the so called Peace Process. In fact, the
real logic of the partial interim approach was that it was intended by its
Israeli and American architects to relieve Israel of having to make any
hard decisions on ending the occupation and settlement of the West
Bank, Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem. Instead, Israeli occupation and
settlement were massively reinforced during the period of negotiations.73
It is for these reasons, and many other, that so many Palestinians were
angered and displeased with the Oslo Peace Process. The Oslo Peace
Accords and the United States involvement, particularly on behalf of
Israel, is another factor in the Israeli, Palestinian conflict.
By July of 2000, it had become clear to Palestinians and the rest of
the world that a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict over state
sovereignty was nowhere close to being solved. It had been almost a
decade since the Camp David Accords and it was abundantly clear that
the Oslo Peace process had failed. Fueled not only by the failure of the
peace process and the continued development of Jewish settlements, the
Palestinians became deeply offended, in September of 2000, when Israeli
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opposition leader, Ariel Sharon, visited the site of Al-Aqsa Mosque and
walked among its ruins, since the mosque was located in East Jerusalem
and it is extremely sacred to Palestinian Muslims. It is also referred to as
the Temple Mount by the Zionists and it is a disputed area between the
Palestinians and Israelis. This calculated act of perceived disrespect on
Sharon’s part triggered the second Palestinian Intifada, also referred to
as the Al-Aqsa Intifada. This Intifada lasted until the winter of 2005 in
an exchange of violence between the Palestinians and the Israeli military.
Images of Palestinian children being gunned down and killed by the
Israeli military were matched with images of Palestinian suicide bombers
killing unarmed citizens at a time in Jerusalem. To the wider world, this
was the picture being painted. Palestinians were armed with their stones
as they fought a military that is backed and funded by the most powerful
military in the world. The Al-Aqsa Intifada turned the international
spotlight back on the Palestinians and their never ending struggle with
the Israeli government.
Since the second Intifada, Palestinians have re-entered global
headlines for their election of the Islamist rejectionist group Hamas into
the government of the Palestinian Authority. Hamas’ representation of
the Gaza Strip further limited the flow of international aid and money
supplied to the Palestinian people. Inability to stem continued violence
culminated in Hamas launching missile attacks into Israel. On
December 27, 2008, Israel launched a major military campaign dubbed
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“Operation Cast Lead” against Hamas in the Gaza Strip. The Israeli
offensive came in response to markedly increased Palestinian rocket fire
following the expiration of a six-month cease-fire on December 19,
followed by a ground offensive into Gaza. Despite international pressure
to halt the fighting (including the passage of U.N. Security Council
Resolution 1860 on January 8), the conflict continued until January 18,
when Israel unilaterally issued a cease-fire and Hamas followed suit
shortly thereafter. Israel’s technological superiority and reliance on
heavy armor and firepower contributed to a wide disparity in casualties—
approximately 1,440 Palestinians died (with some organizations
estimating that at least half of the dead are civilians), as compared with
13 dead (including four civilians) on the Israeli side.74 International
attention has turned to brokering a sustainable cease-fire arrangement
and to addressing the needs of the Gazan population—both in terms of
continued humanitarian assistance and of reconstruction.75 However,
this work contends that instead of trying to rebuild the Gaza Strip and
focus on reconstruction, it would be more beneficial to focus on the
reconstruction of a Palestinian state, and it is to that which we must now
turn.
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CHAPTER 3
CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL ISSUES
Palestinian Political Structure
One of the major obstacles facing the Palestinians is their internal
conflict over contemporary political issues. Palestinians find themselves
engaged in an ideological battle with Palestinian political groups such as
Fatah, Hamas and the PLO. A controversial issue is their situation with
Israel and the status of their independent state. Each political group has
a different philosophy and roadmap as to how to achieve that end. It
pulls the Palestinians in different directions and prevents a sense of
unity. To better understand the conflict, it is important to understand
the history and roles of the political players.
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) was
established on December 11, 1967, six months after the end of the Six
Day War. PFLP's founder and General Secretary was George Habash.76
Habash's leadership of PFLP was supplemented by Wadi' Haddad. Both
men were medical doctors who helped found the Arab Nationalist
Movement, a Pan Arab and Arab Socialist initiative seeking to destroy
Israel and to create, in its stead, a secular, socialist Palestinian
nation. In its fledgling stage, PFLP enjoyed the support of then-Egyptian
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President Gamal Abdul Nasser.77 In 1968, PFLP joined the Palestine
Liberation Organization (PLO) and quickly became its second-largest
faction (behind Fatah); but unlike Fatah, which sought support from
Arab nations, PFLP looked to Russia and China for assistance. Blending
Palestinian nationalism with Marxist ideology, PFLP describes itself as "a
progressive vanguard organization of the Palestinian working class
dedicated to liberating all of Palestine and establishing a democratic
socialist Palestinian state."78 Today, the PFLP has approximately 800
registered members and is headquartered in Syria.
Palestine Liberation Organization
The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was created in 1964.
The PLO was founded at a congress in the Jordanian sector of Jerusalem
in May. Formed as an umbrella organization by refugee groups and
fedayeen (Arab., “commando”) forces, such as Al Fatah, Al Saiqa, and the
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, it was also joined by
professional, labor, and student associations, as well as some individual
members; the fedayeen, however, have always dominated it. The
functions of the PLO are carried out by three main organs: the Executive
Committee, a decision-making body in which the major fedayeen groups
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are represented; the Central Committee, an advisory body; and the
Palestine National Council, which is seen as an assembly of the
Palestinian people.79 For several years it was viewed as the responsible,
mature, state-like framework that they had lacked throughout their
modern history, operating as the almost universally accepted
representative of the Palestinian people.80 It was created to unify the
fractured voices of the Palestinians and represent their interests towards
the creation of their state. Several different political groups belonged to
the PLO, but since it’s inception it has been controlled by Fatah. The
PLO deserves credit, wholly or partially, in three major areas of
achievement for the Palestinians. The first achievement is for creating a
vehicle for the pursuit of their national aims that was universally
accepted among the entirety of the Palestinian people. The creation of an
accepted forum grouping all major Palestinian political forces was
something that no earlier Palestinian political leadership had been able
to achieve.81 For decades, the PLO was the face of the Palestinian
national movement. The second achievement attributed to the PLO is
the recognition of the Palestinian people by the Arab states and later by
the international community. Starting in the early 1970’s, the PLO was
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recognized by the Arab League, the United Nations, and eventually, after
decades of foot-dragging, even by Israel and the United States as the sole
legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.82 The PLO forced the
world to legitimize the Palestinian people. As a result, the international
recognition of the Palestinians and the PLO should be able to influence
global policy that represents the rights of the Palestinian people. This
will only be the case, however, if the PLO does not succumb to the
demands of those who hope to minimize the interests of the Palestinians.
The PLO has also been credited with its recognition of the ultimate
futility of exile politics, and to make the difficult decision to shift its
center of gravity from the countries bordering Israel to the occupied
territories.83 This tactic was implemented while simultaneously
suggesting a two-state solution to the conflict with Israel and was
executed after the Oslo Peace Accords. While the PLO has made several
advances for the Palestinian community, it has also had its share of
turmoil and political losses.
Fatah
Fatah has been extremely dominant in the PLO’s existence. Fatah
was created in the late 1950’s by Arab leaders such as Yasser Arafat and
Khalil al-Wazir. It was a political and military organization initially set
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up as the Palestine National Liberation Movement. One of Fatah’s goals
was to wrestle Palestine away from Israel’s military control through
guerilla warfare. Fatah was accepted by the Palestinians in the 1950s
and 1960s due to their insistent preaching of direct, armed action
against Israel, combined with its independence from Arab governments.84
Fatah was the strongest and most organized of the underground
Palestinian political groups. They were accepted by the Palestinians
because their initial goal was to secure a Palestinian state and rescue the
Palestinians from the Israeli control. It was not until the fifth session of
the Palestine National Council in February of 1969 that Arafat, the leader
of Fatah, was elected chairman of the PLO’s executive committee. Fatah
then took a majority of the seats on the board that had been reserved for
guerilla organizations. This move placed Fatah in political control where
it has remained since. Although Fatah created and held a monopoly in
Palestinian politics for several years, they failed to create unity and
discipline throughout the Palestinian political movement. The need for
power and control by Arafat and his upper level leaders, blurred and
eventually buried the original intent of Fatah thus leaving the door wide
open for other political groups, such as Hamas, to walk in and take
control with the support of the Palestinian masses.
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Yasser Arafat and his role in Palestinian politics are important
because he was a major player in the Palestinians struggle for
independence since the creation of Israel. Arafat was born in the late
1920’s, in Cairo. Both his mother and father were Palestinians.
Throughout his childhood he moved between Egypt and Jerusalem and
by the time he was in his late teens he was smuggling weapons into
Israel to support the uprising of the Palestinian people. Arafat lived
several places after he received his education including; Jordan, Kuwait,
Egypt and Lebanon. After gaining control of the PLO, Arafat and the rest
of the PLO leaders would relocate to different Arab states when
necessary. During the Oslo Peace Accords Arafat was appointed the
leader of the Palestinian Authority. He was in control of the PA from its
inception. When Arafat gave a speech that renounced terrorism and
accepted Israel’s right to exist, he won the Nobel Peace Award for his
gesture of peace with the Israelis. The problem with Arafat was that as
the years went on he became increasingly autocratic and ran the
Palestinian Authority like a Dictatorship. His self serving ideas and
agendas in cooperation with a very conservative Israeli government put a
halt to any progress in the creation of a Palestinian state.
The Palestinian Authority
The Palestinian Authority (PA) was created in September of 1993 at
the Oslo Peace Accord in Washington D.C. The Oslo Peace Accord was
an attempt by the Clinton administration to create a peace deal between
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Israel and Palestine. The Palestinian Authority is a legislative council
and interim self-governing body responsible for the areas of the Gaza
Strip and the West Bank which fall under Palestinian control. It was at
this time that Israel formally recognized the PLO as representatives of the
Palestinian people and granted the Palestinians limited autonomy in the
area of Gaza. The PA was to exercise complete civil and security control
in three different zones of the West Bank as defined and divided by
Israel.85 At the time, the PA was largely viewed as a major success for
the Palestinian people. However, their success would be short lived.
Today, the PA is used to describe the ineffectiveness and corruption of
the Palestinian political establishment. The PA leadership failed to do
much of what it could have done on its own, even in such impossibly
restrictive circumstances. This includes establishing a corruption-free
system of governance based on a rule of law, establishing a balance
between the executive and legislative branches, attracting massive
investment, and creating jobs.86 It is also important to know that the PA
was created under the guise of the United States, with Israeli support,
and has been limited by those political actors. The PA has continuously
had to answer and succumb to the wishes of both the United States and
Israel. The political pressure and interference of these states
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demonstrated the PLO’s inexperience and inability to deal with outside
actors. The first decade of the existence of the PA has been testimony to
the unpreparedness of the PLO leadership for the duties attendant on
creating a real state. It is true that the PLO leaders who dominated the
PA, such as Arafat, were severely inhibited by Israel’s overwhelming
power. In addition, the restrictions written into the Oslo Accords, to
which they themselves had consented, prevented them from obtaining
sovereignty, statehood, or even jurisdiction and real control in most of
the occupied territories. When the PA was established it failed to create a
solid framework for the rule of law, a constitutional system, a balance of
powers, and many of the other building blocks of a modern state.87 In
addition to that, more complications arose when it was immediately
turned over to and controlled by Yasser Arafat. In January 1996, radical
Islamist parties, who did not support the Oslo Peace process, boycotted
scheduled Palestinian elections: this effectively threw the PA entirely into
Arafat’s hands. Arafat was elected president of the Palestinian Authority,
and his supporters won two-thirds of the eighty seats in the Palestine
Legislative Council.88 He now had control of all three major Palestinian
political entities; the PLO, Fatah, and finally the PA. Arafat’s increasing
autocratic behavior was not yielding the best possible political outcomes
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for the Palestinians. Arafat brooked no opposition from the elected
Palestinian Legislative Council, refused for years to sign a Basic Law that
the PA had passed, bullied the legislators, and generally established the
unfortunate precedent of a serious imbalance between the powers of the
executive and legislative branches.89 The lack of sovereignty, absence of
concrete law, government corruption and war discouraged private
investors from investing in Palestinian areas. This lack of investment
has led to a weak economic system and a dependency on other nations
for financial support. However, in spite of the numerous
disappointments and downfalls of the PA, there is a reason it is still
around. The Palestinians need some sort of political entity, corrupt or
not, to help fulfill their ultimate goal of achieving an independent
Palestinian state. For Palestinians, the PLO and PA symbolize their
national aspirations; to abandon them is to abandon hope for an
independent state.90 This Palestinian attitude will help to explain why
Hamas became involved in the corrupt political system.
Hamas
Hamas was created around 1988, during the first Intifada, as an
offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood. It was created to allow members of
the Muslim Brotherhood to participate in the Intifada. Shaykh Ahmed
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Yassin, the founder, believed in the idea of defying Western powers and
ideals and believed that Palestinian Muslims should actively fight for an
Islamic state of Palestine. Hamas was also created, in part, as a reaction
to the ineffectiveness of the PLO since the 1967 conflict with Israel. The
PLO’s position of all talk and no action against Israel, and the Israeli
agenda to dominate Palestinians and their land, led to the formation of
Hamas who wanted the opportunity to represent Palestinians interests.
Hamas set out with an agenda separate from that of the PLO; they
wanted to recognize the Palestinian refugees and their needs. Hamas
was able to gain the support of refugees by focusing on social policies
and the liberation of Palestine from Israel. A one state solution of a
Palestinian state, which is embraced by Hamas, calls for the removal of
all Zionist Jews. Arab Jews that lived in Palestine before the creation of
Israel are able to remain. Hamas built itself on an Islamic
fundamentalist program, which, on the issues of Palestine, is an Islamic
version of the maximalist program that Arab nationalism and Palestinian
nationalism used to uphold in the 1950s-that is, an Islamic Palestinian
state on the whole of Palestine, from which nonindigenous Jews should
leave.91 Hamas is organized into two sectors; military and political. The
political component focuses on humanitarian needs and tends to be
diplomatic. In a genuine spirit of caring for fellow Palestinians, Hamas
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has helped to build schools, charity organizations, hospitals and
religious institutions. The role of the military is much more problematic.
Hamas has resorted to suicide bombing as a military strategy to get the
attention of Israel and the rest of the International community. It is this
strategy that has resulted in the United States title of Hamas as a
“terrorist organization”. However, suicide bombing can be an effective
military strategy as it can command wanted attention. Suicide attacks
are designed to achieve specific political purposes: to coerce a target
government to change policy, to mobilize additional recruits and financial
support or both.92 This could become a potential problem as suicide
bombing can become ineffective as it has the probability to deliver
diminishing returns. The Western media tends to focus on the military
side and less on the humanitarian efforts. The biased attention sheds a
negative light on Hamas and helps to contribute to a skewed perception
of the group. While Hamas has demanded and received recognition, it
has yet to influence any serious policy change. An alternative would be
to gain legitimate, political momentum which is what seems to be
happening as is evident by the 2006 Palestinian elections. In 2006,
Hamas received landslide victories in the Palestinian Authority over
Fatah. A struggle for power has since ensued between Hamas and
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Fatah. Hamas has refused to recognize Israel as a legitimate state and
they do not practice nonviolence, as Fatah has done in the recent past.
Hamas has used its own, newly acquired, legitimacy to pursue a new
Palestinian agenda. They have offered Israel a ten year cease fire
agreement for a return to the 1967 borders which would give the
Palestinians back Gaza, the West Bank and East Jerusalem. Hamas
does not accept Israel’s establishment of Jewish homes in previously
occupied Palestinian homes. Under Hamas, the Palestinian position is
as equally passionate about the removal of Zionist Jews as the Israelis
are of establishing a completely Zionist state. This, of course, threatens
Israel’s very existence and is not very conducive to the creation of a
timely resolution.

Hamas vs. Fatah: Competition for Control
The subsequent corruption of political groups such as Fatah and
the PLO and the death of Yasser Arafat in the fall of 2004, have led
Hamas to the center stage in Palestinian politics. The 2006 elections
gave Hamas a voice in the PA, much to the disappointment of Fatah.
Fatah had been the hegemonic political force in Palestinian politics for
decades. After the political corruption and the death of Arafat, Fatah
was practically paralyzed in the 2006 elections. The corrupt reputation
Fatah maintained led to the demise of its legitimacy as the 3 million
Palestinians that were in their control lost faith and instead turned
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towards Hamas. Hamas and other smaller Islamist rival groups
represent the initial ideals of Fatah. Fatah was given the opportunity to
lead and protect the Palestinian interests and instead became wrapped
up in power and control. They dominated the political arena and
remained uncontested for years, until the political emergence of Hamas.
Hamas realized that the only way they were going to be effective or
legitimized was to “embrace” the PA and gain partial and eventually
majority control. However, this division of Palestinian interests and fight
for control is not beneficial for the overall goal of Palestinian autonomy
and a Palestinian state. Struggles over the most fundamental issues of
politics and state forms will continue until relatively stable new state
organizations have been consolidated; thereafter political struggles
continue about how to use state power in its broadly established form.93
Even if Hamas has partial control of the PA, if political agendas are not
carried out in a more conducive manner to the Palestinian goals, a
Hamas led PA will be as ineffective as a Fatah led PA.

Hamas and Israel: Confrontation and Resistance
Although Hamas is presently being embraced by a majority of
displaced Palestinians, Israel is doing everything it can to discredit the
political group and have them replaced or eliminated. Israel wants to
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push forward with their illegal Jewish settlements and Zionist agenda
without any Palestinian or global interference. Hamas is making this
almost impossible for Israel. Since the emergence of Hamas, as a radical
Islamic group, Israel has been criticized about its illegal pursuit of the
Palestinian occupied land particularly in the areas of Gaza and the West
Bank. Hamas has been very upfront and honest about its solution to the
Israeli Zionist agenda. According to Yassin, Hamas portrayed itself as
the Muslim answer to Jewish Zionism. Palestinian Muslims were obliged
to undertake a jihad against the Israeli occupiers, who had usurped
Muslim land.94 Yassin’s view is remarkably similar to the Zionist
ideology, which views the same land as a divine trust granted to the
Jewish people for all time.95 The entire conflict between Israel and the
Palestinians is about who has the right to the land? Whether a two state
solution is ever agreed upon, either returning to the 1949 Armistice Lines
or to the 1967 borders, the question of who is entitled to the land is
something that Muslims and Jews will disagree on for years to come.
This is due in large part to the rivalry between the two groups. Relations
between rivals have been argued to more conflictual than relations
between other types of states, largely because of the distrust and
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hostility that are said to characterize rivalry.96 However, their
disagreement should not prevent the right of two independent, sovereign
nations to coexist close to one another.

The United States and the Palestinian Issue
In the establishment of a Palestinian state, the role of the United
States and the Western world has been to support the state of Israel.
There is an impression that the United States is so preoccupied with
furthering its own interests that it is insensitive to the needs and
aspirations of broad population segments in the Middle East. This lack
of regard for popular opinion is potentially counterproductive to U.S.
interests in that it promotes anti-American attitudes that can destabilize
or even topple governments aligned with Washington.97 The United
States relationship with Israel is unsettling to surrounding Arab nations.
The U.S. supports Israel by providing them with military weapons and
technology, billions of dollars every year and continuous international
influence and support. Every U.S. presidential administration continues
to do this to obtain and maintain the Jewish vote and appease their
Jewish constituents. If a candidate, who ran for any U.S. office, did not
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publicly support the state of Israel they could have a difficult time being
elected to office. It would be controversial for a candidate to support a
two state solution that would return Israel and Palestine back to the
1967 borders. This is a reality because a majority of Americans are
ignorant to the events going on in Israel. All they know is what the
media tells them. Since the media tends to support Israel, most
Americans support Israel. If more Americans were actually informed
about the reality of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, chances are they
would be less likely to blindly support Israel and then candidates that
support a two state solution would actually have the opportunity to be
elected to office.

The UN and the Palestinian Issue
The United Nations and the international community typically
support Israel because the United States has the largest voice in the UN.
The U.S. also holds the power of veto. Even if a majority of states
belonging to the UN wanted to support a major Palestinian movement,
they would be vetoed by the United States. However, the UN has done
many things to support the Palestinians. When Israel was applying for
admission into the UN in the late 1940s, the UN was very wary of
accepting them. The UN even turned down Israel’s initial application.
Several months later, when Israel resubmitted their intent to join the UN,
the UN Security Council granted their application, but the General
72

Assembly was, again, much wearier to accept. A major concern was that
Israel would not meet Article 4 of the UN charter which mandates that all
nations who join must be a peace-loving state. However, Israel was
granted membership to the UN under addressed stipulations that the
Palestinian question be resolved and be resolved quickly and fairly. Over
the years, the UN has created several committees with an aim of
resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Some of the UN committees
that have been formed are; Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable
Rights of the Palestinian People, Palestine Commission, Palestine
Conciliation Commission, Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees
in the Near East, Special Committee on Palestine, Special Committee to
Investigate Israeli Practice Affecting the Human Rights of the Population
of the Occupied Territories, and many more. If the UN were able to
exercise their right as a collective, global entity without the interference
of other nations, they would probably be able to assist in resolving this
conflict. With the help of the UN and a practice of nonviolence, Israel
and the Palestinians could take the steps to resolve the current situation.
The elected Palestinian political groups could then receive humanitarian
and financial aid and properly rebuild their broken communities.
However, the distrust Palestinians have for the Israeli government is to
be expected, Israel has not followed through on a single commitment
since its establishment in 1948. The international community needs to
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recognize that and provide the proper support to both sides as long as
each side is honoring their commitment.

Arab States and the Palestinian Issue
Middle Eastern involvement from other Arab states has played a
large role in the political development of the Palestinians and their
political relationship with Israel. After the creation of Israel, their role
was much larger than it is today. After Israel was created, Arab states
were doing whatever they could to preserve their culture. They did not
want the influence of the Western world or to be controlled by it. To gain
control over the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, Israel engaged in conflict
with both Egypt and Transjordan and other Arab states such as Lebanon
and Syria. However, although there might have been an initial rally by
Arab nations on behalf of the Palestinians, there were other reasons for
the Arab unity. While Egypt, Syria and Jordan have warred with Israel
ostensibly in the name of the Palestinian plight, Palestinians recognize
that Egyptian, Syrian and Jordanian motives are not altruistic. National
interests motivate the actions of the Arab states neighboring Israel.
Their promotion of the Palestinian cause is often symbolic. It rarely
takes the form of substantive economic or military assistance.98 The
Middle East, as a region, is politically fractured thus contributing to the
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confusion and discourse of a legitimized Palestinian state. The weakness
was shown most obviously in regard to what all Arab peoples regarded as
their common problem: that of Israel and the fate of the Palestinians.99
Overall, involvement by outside Arab states on behalf of the Palestinian
people has had nothing but a negative affect on the Palestinian agenda.
An overarching question is why can’t the Middle East, as a region,
wrestle Israel away from the Jews and help the Palestinians create an
autonomous state? That these twenty-one states-which posses almost
two-thirds of the world’s proven oil reserves, now number 260 million
people and have several million men under arms-have not been able to
gain the upper hand diplomatically or militarily against Israel, to say
nothing of regaining all of the West Bank and Gaza, attests to the fact
that the Arab states have not really united behind the Palestinians.
From the moment Jewish settlement began to pose a serious threat to
Palestinians, Arab leaders sought to gain advantage for themselves and
their states out of the confrontation between those two peoples.100 Just
as the Arab states have hesitated to dedicate themselves to the military
objective of ‘liberating Palestine,’ so have they been unable to coordinate
diplomatic strategies to that end.101 The political insecurities of the
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region create a “survival of the fittest” attitude for many Arab states.
Most are trying to maintain their own sovereignty and autonomy. Some
have suggested that for Arab regimes, the Palestinian cause is merely a
pawn in inter-Arab rivalry.102 After the establishment of Israel, Egypt
and Transjordan struggled to maintain control of Gaza and the West
Bank. They were weak militarily and did not have access to the type of
funds that Israel did and their governments were being thrown into
turmoil as they were losing their legitimacy with the people. Also, with
the United States backing Israel, many Arab states did not, at that time,
want to engage in conflict with the United States. Arab states are aware
that selfless national dedication to the Palestinian cause would lead
immediately to a confrontation with Israel that no Arab state could win
alone, even with the support of several others.103 On the other hand,
leaders of the Arab states hope a favorable resolution of the Arab-Israeli
conflict might emerge, but they are reluctant to take great risks to
achieve that end.104 A focus on Palestinian involvement and action with
other Arab nations shows a detrimental effect to their political agenda.
As a result of their position during the Gulf War, the PLO, Hamas, and
other Palestinian organizations paid dearly for the so-called “principled
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position” that the Palestinians took during the Gulf crisis.105 Financial
aid from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia ended and thousands of Palestinian
workers and students were expelled from the Persian Gulf, forcing them
to return to occupied territories where there was no money or jobs or
homes. In addition, it contributed to the crowding and overpopulation of
the area. The dysfunctional relationship that was created and continues
between the Palestinian people and the surrounding Arab states
contributes to Israel’s success in the area. Were the involved Arab states
more stable and legitimized, both regionally and internationally, the
Palestinian agenda of a sovereign Palestinian state would have been
achieved by now.

Israel and the Current Palestinian Conflict
Israel plays a major role in the current conflict with the
Palestinians. The policies and agendas that they implement contribute
to the civil unrest between the Palestinians and Israelis. Israel’s main
political agenda is to maintain their Jewish state. They are doing
everything in their power to protect their sovereign, Zionist interests.
They have made it abundantly clear that they are not going to allow
anyone or anything to stand in the way of their Zionist state, even if that
means expanding into new territory. However, not all Israelis support
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the current Zionist agenda. There are Israelis that support a two state
solution and want to see the establishment of a Palestinian state.
Israel’s internal political conflict is over the establishment of a
Palestinian state. There are three major Israeli political parties that are
all founded on a Zionist platform, but they differ from one another in
their Zionist agendas. The three major parties are: center-left Labor,
center-right Likud, and centrist Kadima.106 The conservative party,
Likud, supports the expansion of the Jewish settlements into the West
Bank and Gaza Strip. Conservative Israelis support anything that
expands the state of Israel and fulfills their Zionist obligation to God.
Likud emphasizes the belief that peace can only come when groups such
as Hamas and Hezbollah are dismantled. The party is now led by former
(and current) Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.107 The liberal party,
Labor, is more sympathetic to the Palestinian people. In recent years,
Labor has argued for increasing the minimum wage and emphasizing
social democratic policies, while pushing for negotiations with Israel’s
Arab neighbors. The most famous Labor politician is Yitzhak Rabin, who
signed the Oslo Accords and the Israel-Jordan Treaty, and won the Nobel
Peace Prize with Yasser Arafat and Shimon Peres before being
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assassinated.108 Kadima is the newest Israeli political party that was
established in 2005 by former Likud party member, Ariel Sharon.
Kadima's official platform combines traditional rightwing rhetoric--the
Jewish people's right to the undivided Land of Israel--with pragmatic
policies on peace and security: a negotiated settlement and the creation
of a Palestinian state. Yet this leftist tendency is matched by a
unilateralist and expansionist agenda more reminiscent of traditional
Likud attitudes.109 The undisputable division of the Israeli political
community is testament to the internal friction due to the Palestinian
question.
Nonetheless, Israel has had the oversight to create, establish and
maintain a series of policies that both protect it from outside threats and
simultaneously control the surrounding Palestinian community. The
implementation of these policies has severely limited the Palestinians
ability to do anything. Israel’s position has been to control the
Palestinians to help eliminate the threat they feel for their own
independent state. One of the first policies that were implemented by the
Israelis on the Palestinians was a system of martial law. The Defense
Emergency Regulations provided a full set of regulations for martial law
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rule, and the government imposed martial law.110 Israeli martial law
included a curfew for all Palestinians, a travel permit for any Arab
traveling out of their home village and military checkpoints to enforce the
travel permits. It fined or imprisoned Arabs found without a pass, or
with an expired pass, or on a route different from that prescribed in the
pass.111 The martial law over the Arabs is a colonial regime enforced by
colonial law.112 Another policy that Israel established was the Absentee’s
Property Law. This law, adopted in 1950, permitted confiscation of the
land of a person deemed an ‘absentee.’ It defined ‘absentee’ to include
any Palestinian who in 1948 left the land to go either to another state or
to an area of Palestine held by Arab League Forces.113 This policy allowed
the Israeli government to make large land claims and begin their Zionist
expansion with the establishment of Jewish settlements. It also
contributed to the refugee problem and encouraged a negative response
from the Palestinian community. The situation only compounded in
1953 when the Land Acquisition Law passed and the Israeli government
was given title to all of the absentee land. Economically, Israel also hit
the Palestinians hard. The government sequestered as enemy property,
the bank accounts of expelled Arabs, saying it would release them only if
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the Arab states would make peace with Israel.114 The Arab families that
had fled during the 1948 war, no longer had ownership of their homes
and land, but also no access to their money. Once the Palestinian
communities had been established in Gaza and the West Bank, Israel
would pump money into cities, but only into the Jewish sectors. The
Arab sectors, sometimes the most impoverished, received no financial aid
or funding. Arab towns and villages struggle because it is Israeli policy
to deny the foundations of a solid infrastructure, such as roads, sewage
lines or communication systems. Education is another area where
Israelis spend more money per student for Jewish students over Arab
students.115 All of the Israeli policies that have hindered and slowed
down the Palestinian people are the same policies that are fueling the
violent state of affairs they find themselves engaged in now. The
underlying fear for Israel is the safety of their state. It is what is
preventing a solution to the Arab-Palestinian conflict. If Israel could
unite politically with one agenda and they could recognize the civil rights
of others, a solution could be reached with the Palestinians.
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CHAPTER 4
STATE BUILDING: THE SEARCH FOR A PALESTINIAN STATE
For the Palestinians to be able to create a strong and independent
state, time and attention needs to be focused on their infrastructure.
What fundamental aspects of a state do the Palestinians already have
and what aspects do they lack? An observation of road systems,
communication systems, schools, sewage systems, natural resources and
land are all necessary to measure the viability of a successful Palestinian
state. It is also important to assess the Palestinians, as a people and
culture and examine their role in the state building process. The
Palestinian economy is also going to play a major role in the
establishment of their state. An examination of the Palestinian economy,
GDP, foreign aide and income distribution is mandatory for determining
the possible success of an independent Palestinian state.

Demographics
According to the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, the 2008
data shows the Palestinian population in the West Bank and Gaza was
3,825,512.116 The estimated population of the West Bank is 2.4 million;
1.2 million males and 1.2 million females. While the estimated
population of Gaza Strip totaled 1.5 million; 755 thousand males and
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732 thousand females.
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Data revealed that the Palestinian Territory

has a young population; the percentage of individuals aged (0-14)
constitutes 41.9% of the total population in mid 2009, of which 40.0%
reside in the West Bank and 44.9% in Gaza Strip. The elderly population
aged (65 years and over) constitute 3.0% of the total population, 3.4% in
the West Bank and 2.5% in Gaza Strip.118 The disparity between the
young and old could play a crucial role in the establishment of a
Palestinian state. The older generations of Palestinians have failed to
create a Palestinian state. Their methods and actions were ineffective. If
the younger generations of Palestinians can learn from those mistakes
and embrace a new strategy in state building, they have more
opportunity to create a successful independent state. For an
independent state to become a reality, the younger generations of
Palestinians are going to have to focus on literacy and their educations.
The illiteracy rate among individuals aged 15 years or over in the
Palestinian Territory was 5.9% in 2008. The illiteracy gap is significantly
noticed among males and females, at 2.9% and 9.1% respectively. The
results showed differences in the illiteracy rate between the West Bank
and Gaza Strip, 6.1% and 5.6% respectively, while the illiteracy rate
among males in West Bank is higher than in Gaza Strip (2.9% and 2.7%
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respectively), while it is lower among females 15 years and over in Gaza
Strip than in the West Bank (8.6% and 9.4% respectively).119 Education
statistics show that the percentage of individuals (15 years and over) who
have completed university education (Bachelor and above) was 8.8%.
While the percentage of individuals who did not complete any stage of
education, reached 12.5%. These results showed that there were
differences between males and females in educational attainment, where
the percentage of males who have completed university education
(Bachelor and above) was 9.9% compared to 7.6% for females. As for
those who did not complete any stage of education, the percentage
among males was 9.4% compared to 15.7% for females.120 The
dedication of time and energy into a strong infrastructure for the
Palestinians will create a strong educational system that will allow
Palestinians to receive their education. The fact that there is no money
available for or spent on Palestinian schools, explains the current
educational statistics. The Palestinians that are educated work outside
of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. In fact, most Palestinians who
work, regardless of education, do not work in the West Bank or Gaza
they work in Israel.121 The only way to gain employment to support their
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family is to work in the surrounding towns of Israel. In regard to
Palestinian families, the fertility rate has dropped in the last forty years.
According to UNICEF, in 1970 the fertility rate was 7.9 and when new
statistics came out in 2007, the fertility rate had dropped to 5.2.122 With
the establishment of strong education system, Palestinians will be able to
utilize their education in their own towns and create new businesses that
will in turn create new jobs. The overall demographics of the Palestinian
people prove that they are not a small, irrelevant group of people whose
interests should be cast aside. There are millions of Palestinians trying
to survive and maintain their culture and families and sense of
statehood.

Economic Indicators
Another critical component to the success of an independent
Palestinian state is the Palestinian economy and its ability to provide for
an independent state. The Palestinians have several profitable industries
that could contribute to the overall economic welfare of their state. The
Palestinians profitable industries include; stone, construction material,
textiles and garments, handicrafts, metal and engineering, chemicals,
pharmaceuticals, plastics, tourism and most importantly agriculture.123
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The agricultural sectors in the Palestinian territories are most known for
their production of olives and olive oil. However, the economic sanctions
that are imposed on the Palestinians by the Israelis prohibit the
Palestinians from developing their economy to its true potential. There
are very strong links between the Israeli and Palestinian agricultural
markets. Israeli fruit, potato, and onion producers, packers and
wholesalers have very efficient links to West Bank and Gaza wholesale
markets. The West Bank and Gaza fruit and vegetable distribution is
primarily through lower cost farmers’ markets and through local
retailers. The West Bank and Gaza supply the Israeli market with crops
such as tomatoes, cucumbers, zucchini, eggplant, green peppers and
guavas. Some high value added products such as strawberries and
flowers are also supplied to the Israeli market for re-export.124 The
Palestinians overall income received in 2008 was US$1.6 billion. There
was a decline in the value of GDP for the rest of the West Bank and Gaza
Strip during the third quarter of 2008 by 0.6% compared with the second
quarter of the same year. Also the fourth quarter of 2008 attend to a
decrease by 3.0% compared with the third quarter of the same year,
while it rose from the corresponding quarter of 2007 by 2.3% at constant
prices. The estimates indicate that the activities of agriculture and
fisheries, transport and storage and communications, construction
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activity, mining and quarrying, have seen a decline in the short-term
economic indicators available during 2008 by 15.7%, 4.1%, 19.0%, 9.7%
respectively, compared with 2007.125 Palestinians do have the resources,
labor force and knowledge to sustain a supportive economic system for
an independent state. However, Israeli interference and economic
sanctions are going to have to be eliminated for the Palestinians to be
successful. Palestinian income distribution is another economic
indicator of that was measured in 2006. The consequences of price rises
in global markets were keenly felt in the life of the refugees, with an
individual income of not more that $2 a day. The year 2006 saw 35% of
students from the refugee camps leave their university studies. The
dropout rate for elementary-school students had also increased, which
had led to new social problems such as child labor, theft, road accidents,
and vandalism, as well as to new occupations, including the collection of
scrap metal.126 The lack of income distribution and earning potential
among Palestinians forces them to rely on international foreign aid.
The Palestinian refugees grabbed the attention of the international
community after the first Intifada. With the recognition of the
Palestinian hardships, other states have provided monetary aid to the
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Palestinian community in hopes of preparing them for an independent
state. On December 17, 2007, eighty-seven countries and international
organizations met in Paris and pledged to provide $7.4 billion over three
years to the Palestinian Authority (PA), an amount far in excess of any
previous level of U.S. or European aid to the Palestinians. The conference
participants justified the aid as a means of providing "immediate support
to the entire Palestinian population," and as a reward intended to
strengthen those Palestinians who favor peaceful coexistence with
Israel.127 The Paris conference aid package continues fifteen years of
international funding that has established the Palestinians as one of the
world's leading per capita recipients of foreign support. Figures
published by the Organization of Economic Cooperation and
Development for 2005 show that Palestinians received $304 per person
in foreign aid, second only to the war-torn Republic of Congo among
entities with populations larger than one million.128 The EU was the
biggest aid donor to the Palestinian government until the Hamas
militants came to power in March 2006. Since then, the EU has
redirected its aid, worth 700m euros (US $943m) in 2006, through a
special mechanism to help the neediest people while bypassing the
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government to avoid contact with Hamas.129 In fiscal year 2005, the
Bush Administration and Congress significantly increased U.S. economic
aid to the Palestinians through supplemental appropriations and by
reprogramming economic aid that had been appropriated in previous
years. President Bush also used his authority to provide $50 million in
direct assistance to the Palestinian Authority, marking only the fourth
time a U.S. president has used a congressionally authorized waiver to
channel aid away from US AID programs and directly to the PA.130 Since
the signing of the Oslo Accord in 1993, the U.S. government has
committed more than $1.8 billion in economic assistance to the
Palestinians. Approximately 80% of U.S. funding for the Palestinians has
been channeled through USAID contractors and 20% through private
voluntary organizations (PVOs). According to annual foreign operations
legislation, congressionally approved funds for the West Bank and Gaza
Strip cannot be used for the Palestinian Authority, unless the President
submits a waiver to Congress citing that doing so is in the interest of
national security.131 In 2006, Palestinians held a democratic election for
seats in the Palestinian Authority. Hamas won the Gaza Strip and won
several seats from the opposing party, Fatah. Due to the split in the PA
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by political groups Fatah and Hamas, international aid was dramatically
reduced to the Palestinians. When Hamas took power the Bush
Administration, along with its Quartet partners and Israel, responded by
cutting off contact with and halting assistance to the PA. The
Administration sought to isolate and remove Hamas while supporting
moderates in Fatah, led by President Mahmud Abbas. The international
sanctions have not driven Hamas from power, and instead, some assert
they may have provided an opening for Iran to increase its influence
among Palestinians by filling the void.132 Beginning in the early 1990s,
Iran has supplied cash, arms, and training to Hamas, but most
observers say the relationship has been an uneasy one.133 Since the aid
boycott was enacted by the United States and other states, Iran has
increased its assistance to Hamas.134 The International Monetary Fund
(IMF) estimates that in 2006 some $70 million in cash was carried into
the territories, most of it thought to be from Iran. After a visit to Iran in
December 2006, Prime Minister Haniyeh said Iran had agreed to provide
$120 million in assistance in 2007 and up to $250 million in total.135 The
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funds were earmarked to pay the wages of civil servants, bankroll Hamas
security forces, and compensate Palestinian families that lost their
homes during Israeli military operations.136 Iran is a major supporter of
Hamas because they have very similar views about Western influence
and the corruption it can create for Arab states. Iran would like to see
an independent Palestine, even if it there are self-interested reasons
behind it.

Current Economic Impacts of the Israeli Policies
Israel’s control and interference with the Palestinian economy has
created major difficulties for their overall economic performance. Ten
percent of the Palestinian GDP is ordered to the Israeli treasury each
year.137 After the 1993 declaration of peace the Israeli and Palestinian
economies became interconnected. While Israel benefited from the peace
agreement, the Palestinian economy collapsed. The reality of the
Palestinian refugee situation is that Palestinians are forced to find work
in Israel. This is a mutually beneficial situation when the economy is
flourishing and the Palestinians and Israelis are getting along. If either
of those circumstances change, which they have, the Palestinians are the
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ones who are negatively affected. For example, after the first Intifada,
Israel dramatically reduced the number of work permits that were issued
and they became more hard lined in their work permit policies.138 In
addition, the working environments for Palestinians within Israel were
not safe. Israel’s control of the borders is also problematic at times.
Israel has closed the borders, for days at a time, to prevent the
Palestinian work force from their jobs.139 When Israeli migration began
to increase and there was a decline in the Israeli economy, Israel denied
jobs to Palestinians to create more jobs for the new Jewish settlers.
Israel restricts Palestinian manufacturing and agriculture and places
additional restrictions on Palestinian exports to other countries. Israel
bases its economic policy on their political concerns with the
Palestinians.140 This is a typical practice within most states. However,
because the political situation with the Palestinians has been so volatile
over the years, the Israeli economic policies have mirrored that volatility.
Israeli economic policies are not at all beneficial for the Palestinians and
their economic development. The economic integration of the two
economies together was imposed by Israel to serve their better interests.
Under this new system, the Israelis were able to control the welfare of the
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Palestinian people.141 The increased dependency of the Palestinians on
the Israelis led to lower exports and higher imports. It eliminated any
competition between producers. Palestinian entrepreneurs had to apply
for licenses from the Israeli authorities for many of the economic
activities they sought to initiate. Israel’s policy, at least since the 1990’s,
has been to slow down local economic development. This policy, and the
measures taken to implement it, also contributed to transforming
important parts of the Palestinian economy into a captive market for
Israeli producers.142 Israel has done nothing to promote the local
Palestinian economy; it has been discouraged to protect the Israeli
markets. When Palestinians wanted to implement their own trade policy,
Israel insisted on a more protectionist policy.143 Palestinians have
pushed for a free trade agreement which would necessitate the
demarcation of borders between their economy and Israel’s. The Israelis
rejected the notion of any borders being drawn that would separate the
two economies. The reasons for both of their positions were both
economic and political. Palestinians were trying to establish as many
sovereign qualities as they could and Israelis wanted to defer as many
decisions as possible over the possibility of independent Palestinian
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state.144 It was agreed on by both sides to create a Palestinian Monetary
Authority to help solve the problems of financial intermediation. The
PMA was to have all the powers vested in a central bank through a
banking system, but not the power to issue an independent Palestinian
currency due to its symbolic expression of independence.145 Israeli trade
regulation, labor flow control and the lack of a Palestinian currency all
have been put in place to limit Palestinian sovereignty. The economic
interdependence of the Palestinian and Israeli economies should be
mutually beneficial and that it clearly not the case. Political stability
plays a major role in economic development and it is necessary for
economic growth and economic stability.146 It encourages outside
investment. In fact, it could be the political and economic instability and
lack of Palestinian sovereignty that is contributing to the violence
between the Israelis and Palestinians.

Physical Infrastructure
The reality of a strong, effective Palestinian infrastructure is
necessary for the legitimate development of a viable, independent
Palestinian state. The components of a strong infrastructure are; roads,
schools, sewage systems, communication systems, territorial integrity
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and natural resources. The Palestinians will need to be able to establish
and maintain these necessities if they hope to be able to provide for and
support their people. For an independent state of Palestine to be viable,
the Gaza Strip and the West Bank are going to need to be joined to
provide the state with the territorial integrity that they deserve.
Palestinians have lost their land and jeopardized their geographical
integrity as a result of the expansion of Jewish settlements by the Zionist
agenda of the Israeli government. The establishment of these
settlements has limited the Palestinians ability to create their own state.
The West Bank barrier wall that has been constructed by the Israeli
government is another way in which the geographic identity of the
Palestinians is being violated. Although the Israeli government claims
the wall is necessary to protect Israeli citizens from Palestinian violence,
some feel it is an illegal attempt by the Israelis to annex land from the
Palestinians. The wall violates international law and yet it still remains.
Palestinians need to be given the right to unite their territories. If Israel
returns to the 1967 borders, the two territories will unite. If the
Palestinian land remains divided, the people will become more divided
than they already are. Palestinians need to be allowed to create their
infrastructure in peace, without the outside threat of the Israelis.
The problem with the Palestinian infrastructure, at this time, is
that there is no Palestinian infrastructure. Any roads that run
throughout the West Bank or Gaza are developed and maintained by
95

Israel. The WBGS road network is just over 2,000 km in length, with
750 km of main roads, 550 km of regional roads, and 850 km of local
roads. Virtually all the major roads were constructed before 1967 and
have received minimal or no maintenance. International transportation
(ports and airports) are almost entirely under Israeli control. The
exceptions are the bridges to Jordan and the Rafah crossing to Egypt.147
The same applies to the electricity utilized by the Palestinians. It
is owned and operated by the Israelis. Over 95 percent of households
have electricity connections. Those not connected tend to be located in
remote communities. However, connection does not necessarily imply an
adequate or steady supply of electricity. Presently, the WBGS has access
to about 300 Mw of power, almost entirely supplied by the Israel Electric
Company (IEC). Certain village communities not connected to the grid
use local generators.148
The lack of natural resources, or the Palestinians lack of access to
the natural resources in their territory, is another important element of
their infrastructure that needs to be retrieved from the Israelis. Water
quality has been steadily deteriorating. With depleting aquifers, seawater
seepage in the Gaza Strip has rendered the water brackish. The entry of
sewage, fertilizers, and other chemicals into the water system continually
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damages the water quality. Water supply is substantially, and
increasingly, dependent upon the Israeli company, Mekoroth, though not
quite to the same extent as electricity. Israel restricts the digging of new
wells by Palestinians. New sources within the WBGS can be tapped by
Mekoroth, which then supplies distributors in the Palestinian areas.149
Amnesty International has done a recent investigation into the
Palestinian water supply and has found Israeli water restrictions
discriminate against Palestinians in the occupied West Bank. It says
that in Gaza, Israel's blockade has pushed the already ailing water and
sewage system to "crisis point". Amnesty says that on average Palestinian
daily water consumption reaches 70 liters a day, compared with 300
liters for the Israelis. It says that some Palestinians barely get 20 liters a
day, the minimum recommended even in humanitarian emergencies.150
Water is the most important natural resource, not only for personal
survival, but to maintain the Palestinians major economic market; their
agriculture market. For the Palestinian agriculture market to succeed,
Palestinians need to have access to as many natural resources as
possible.
The Palestinian communication systems will also need to be
assessed and developed. Restricted access to telecommunications
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presents a major limitation for growth. With 78,000 phones, there are
just over three phones for every 100 persons. Due to the extreme
shortage of conventional phones, 25,000 mobile phones are in use (about
one mobile phone for 100 persons). Prior to the peace process,
telecommunication services were supplied by the Israeli company, Bezeq,
and the ICA controlled the local access to service. Since 1993, the local
loop is controlled by the PA's Ministry of Communications. However,
most long-distance services, even within the Palestinian areas, and all
international services, continue to be provided by Bezeq. The lack of
phones is already proving a constraint to investment. In Ramallah,
obtaining a phone connection is a major undertaking and has deterred
investors. If the vision of an information society is to be seriously
pursued, and if trade in services is to take off, basic phone service needs
a major boost.151
The sewage and sanitation systems are also in serious need of a
complete overhaul. The most serious immediate problem is the state of
sanitation services. The share of households connected to sewage
networks is small by any standard, at 25 percent. Collection, treatment,
and disposal of sewage are growing problems. The networks, where they
exist, are under great strain and are liable to burst frequently, risking
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people's health and causing severe disruption to the movement of goods
and people as roads are flooded.152

Political Institutions
The Palestinian political infrastructure needs to be modified and
reorganized. The corruption that has been so prevalent within Fatah and
the PA needs to be addressed and eliminated. The Palestinians have the
ability and education to create and sustain a strong infrastructure that
can contribute to the success of an independent Palestinian state. The
best situation for the state may be a regular flow of elite university
graduates, including many with sophisticated technical training, into
official careers that are of such high status as to keep the most
ambitious and successful from moving on to non-state positions.153 A
unified, legitimized Palestinian political system is possible if the political
parties are willing to make compromises for the establishment of a
Palestinian state. The political system needs to represent all of the
Palestinians because Palestinians can no longer allow themselves to be
segregated into Gaza and West Bank Palestinians. The Palestinian
Authority needs to be held accountable for their actions. The PA was
created to be the foundation of a Palestinian political system that the
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world wanted to deal with. It is time the Palestinians took ownership of
their role in the establishment of their state and work towards creating a
political system that can actually govern the Palestinians as a state.
Obviously, sheer sovereign integrity and the stable administrativemilitary control of a given territory are preconditions for any state’s
ability to implement policies. Beyond this, loyal and skilled officials and
plentiful financial resources are basic to state effectiveness in attaining
all sorts of goals.154 For the Palestinians to create a new, uncorrupt
Palestinian Authority the issue of the number of people who are actually
educated and qualified to fill those types of positions must be addressed.
The number of Palestinians that are qualified for bureaucratic positions
and the responsibility associated with it is extremely limited. The
Palestinians that are educated and prepared for those positions are
already in those positions, thus further exacerbating the situation. The
meritocracy within the political positions creates a detrimental cycle for
the future of Palestinian institutions. With the creation of a solid
infrastructure and the development and progress of Palestinian
education, the Palestinians will be able to fill and supplement
bureaucratic positions and avoid an extended tradition of corruption.
When a Palestinian institution is established that is accepted by the
majority, Palestinians that have found work elsewhere will have a reason

154

Skocpol, 16

100

to return and invest in their state. Qualified, educated Palestinians will
not have to look outside for careers and Arab migration will have the
opportunity to increase.
Palestinians need a political system that can handle and account
for the millions of dollars they receive in foreign aid every year. The PA
needs to be controlled by political leaders that are going to utilize and
invest the money into a solid infrastructure for the Palestinians to build
off of. The appearance of corruption and self interest must be avoided.
Strategies in institution building suggest a successful framework that
can include the introduction of elements of accountability into
organizations, the de-layering or simplification of operations to reduce
errors and opportunities to conceal corruption, as well as more
fundamental reforms seeking to change the attitudes and beliefs of those
who work in an institution. In some cases, institutions may be
completely eliminated or restructured for a fresh start, or completely new
institutions may be created.155

The establishment of a new, unified PA

will provide the foundation for a solid infrastructure to support a new
Palestinian state. The PA will be able to organize and establish all the
other components of a successful infrastructure, leading to the healthy
development of a strong Palestinian state. As an institution, the PA has
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the potential to be rebuilt and reorganized. The Palestinians do not have
to create a brand new institution, they need to remake the PA into the
institution it was meant to be, free of corruption. The target group at
which institution-building reforms are directed must also be widened to
include all parts of society interested in creating and maintaining
national integrity.156 To create an independent state of Palestine from
the inside out, the Palestinians will need to evaluate and adjust all of the
political institutions and their role within the political infrastructure.
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CONCLUSION
Looking forward, what are the possible conflict resolutions,
currently being discussed, that can bring an end to the PalestinianIsraeli conflict? A popular opinion is a two state solution which would
re-establish the 1967 borders and give the Palestinians complete,
autonomous control of the Gaza Strip, the West Bank and East
Jerusalem. Some unrealistic, alternate solutions that have been
suggested are to create single states, one entirely Israeli, the other
entirely Palestinian. The solution of a single Israeli state is proposed and
supported by the Zionist movement. The single state solutions have no
chance of being followed through to fruition. The most beneficial, allencompassing solution would be the suggested two-state solution where
the independent states of Israel and Palestine co-exist next to one
another. However, for the two state solution to be successful, several
things would need to transpire. One would be that the state of Palestine
would need to be granted the territory of the 1967 borders, which will
unite the Gaza Strip and West Bank to allow for territorial integrity. A
unified territory is necessary in the establishment of a sovereign state.
Another situation that needs to be addressed is the continuous
development and expansion of Jewish settlements in Palestinian areas.
Israel will have to grant the Palestinians an autonomous state which will
eliminate the Zionist agenda of expanding Jewish settlements into
Palestinian areas. Another suggested solution is that of Restoration.
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This would mean that Israel would be required to allow Arabs to return
to their original areas and homes and not only the refugees, but the
Arabs that fled Palestine in 1948. Palestinians need to be granted the
security to build a solid foundation for a new state.
Whether one of the above mentioned solutions or a new solution is
suggested, it is time to put an end to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The
Western attitude that all Arabs and Middle Easterners have been fighting
since the beginning of time and will always continue to fight is a
perspective the world can no longer accept. It is time to re-evaluate and
challenge the entire situation and begin holding Israel responsible for
their actions. If that also includes holding the United States responsible,
then that time has come. Over the years both sides have created their
own interpretations of the events that have made up this conflict during
the course of the twentieth century. Each has sought to convince the
rest of the world that its version is the correct one. Israel has enjoyed
greater success in this effort for a variety of reasons. History is written
by the victors. In this case the victors, largely of European descent, have
the skills, contacts, and receptive audiences in the West that ensured the
predominance of their arguments.157 By removing the United States, as
a major player, from the equation perhaps surrounding Arab states could
make a united stand to protect the Palestinian interest. Their united
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front could benefit the current regimes in power by legitimizing their
position and demonstrating a level of power. Muslims all over the world
are understandably exacerbated with their leaders for having failed to
defeat the Israelis, either militarily or diplomatically, in over five
decades.158 Concurrently, if Hamas were legitimized by their
surrounding region as the elected representatives of the Palestinian
people, that in turn could lead to their legitimacy in the international
community which could influence support for the viability of an
established Palestinian state. Hamas has made several attempts to
propel themselves forward ideologically. There has been an evolution in
the attitude of Hamas with regard to participation in the political
process. They moved from an extremist position rejecting participation
in any political process, like elections, under the occupation to a much
cleverer one-as it proves now in light of the success they are achieving-of
getting involved in the political process.159 Just because Hamas is not
embraced by the United States simply because they are a threat to the
Israeli agenda, does not mean that the rest of the world needs to adopt
the same attitude. In fact, if the U.S. were to create a more even-handed
policy in regards to the West Bank and Gaza, it could actually contribute
to the establishment of a Palestinian state.
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The Palestinians are ready for their own independent, sovereign
state. The principle of respect for the sovereignty of nations is and must
remain the cornerstone of international law.160 Palestinians have the
potential to be very successful with an autonomous state. For example,
the Palestinian people are well educated and value higher education.
They have both financial and social capital. Their social capital includes
a well organized civil society, NGOs, Universities and hospitals that
provide public services. Palestinians have a rich culture and before the
1967 War, Palestinians made a lot of their overall profits from tourism.
Once the Arab-Israeli conflict comes to an end, people will feel more
confident to travel back into Palestinian areas and revive their culture
and traditions. Palestinians are debt free because they have a good tax
system and they receive a lot of international aid. Combine with the
financial aid they also have a lot of international sympathy and support.
This support can lead to direct foreign investment which will help boost
the Palestinian economy.
A solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict and the establishment of an
independent Palestinian state does not mean that there will never be
another conflict between the two groups again. The rest of the world can
only hope that non-violent agreements can be suggested and
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accomplished. The struggle for peace is certainly not a struggle 'to
abolish power' just as little as it is an attempt 'to get rid of conflicts'. It is
an effort to steer the exercise of power in non-violent directions and to
steer conflicts towards non-violent and creative forms of conflict
resolution.161 A mutual respect for sovereign states is necessary for the
Palestinians and Israelis to coexist in an ancient territory. Their further
development within a peaceful conflict resolution will ensure the survival
of that respect.

Galtung, Johan. “Twenty-Five Years of Peace Research: Ten Challenges and Some
Responses.” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Jun., 1985), 141-158.
161

107

BIBLIOGRAPHY
-Amin, Samir. “Globalism or Apartheid on a Global Scale?” The Modern
World-System in the Longue Duree. Ed. Immanuel Wallerstine. Colorado:
Paradigm Publishers, 2004.
-Arnon A. J. Weinblatt. “Sovereignty and Economic Development: The
Case of Israel and Palestine.” The Economic Journal. Massachusetts:
Blackwell Publishers, 2001.
-Bill, James A. and Robert Springborg. Politics in the Middle East. New
York: Addison Wesley Longman, Inc., 2000.
- Chase-Dunn, Christopher K. Global Formation: Structures of the World
Economy. Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1998.
-Chilcote, Ronald H. Theories of Comparative Politics: The Search for a
Paradigm Reconsidered. Colorado: Westview Press, 1981.
-Chomsky, Noam and Gilbert Achcar. Perilous Power: The Middle East
and U.S. Foreign Policy. Michigan: Hamish Hamilton, 2007.
-Cleveland, William L. A History of the Modern Middle East. Colorado:
Westview Press, 2004.
- Cole, Juan. Sacred Space and Holy War: The Politics, Culture and
History of Shiite Islam. New York: I.B. Tauris, 2002.
-Diwan, Ishac, Radwan A. Shaban. Development Under Adversity: The
Palestinian Economy in Transition. Washington D.C.: The International
Bank for Reconstruction/The World Bank, 1999.
-Enayat, Hamid. Modern Islamic Political Thought. Austin, TX. University
of Texas Press, 1982.
-Evans, Peter. Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial
Transformation. New Jersey: Princeton, 1995.
- Evans, Peter B. “Government Action, Social Capital and Development:
Reviewing the Evidence on Synergy” Global, Area, and International
Archive. 1997. <http://escholarship.org/uc/item/1f0812j7>

108

-Evans, Peter B. “Predatory, Developmental, and Other Apparatuses: A
Comparative Political Economy Perspective on the Third World State.”
Sociological Forum, Vol. 4, No. 4, Special Issue: Comparative National
Development: Theory and Facts for the 1990s (Dec., 1989), 561-587.
-Galtung, Johan. “A Structural Theory of Imperialsim.” Journal of Peace
Research, Vol. 8, No. 2 (1971), 81-117.
-Galtung, Johan. “Twenty-Five Years of Peace Research: Ten Challenges
and Some Responses.” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Jun.,
1985), 141-158.
-Hensel, Paul R. “Evolution in Domestic Politics and the Development of
Rivalry: The Bolivia-Paraguay Case.” Evolutionary Interpretations of
World Politics. Ed. William R. Thompson. New York: Routledge, 2001.
-Hourani, Albert. A History of the Arab Peoples. New York: Harvard
University Press, 1991.
-Husain, Mir Zohair. Global Islamic Politics. USA: Harpercollins College
Publishers, 1995.
-Ismael, Tareq Y. International Relations of the Contemporary Middle
East: A Study in World Politics. New York, Syracuse University Press,
1986.
-Khalidi, Rashid. The Origins of Arab Nationalism. Columbia University
Press, 1991.
-Khalidi, Rashid. The Iron Cage: the Story of the Palestinian Struggle for
Statehood. Massachusetts: Beacon Press, 2007.
-Laquer, Walter. The Israeli-Arab Reader: a Documentary History of the
Middle East Conflict. Bantam Books, 1976.
-Mideastweb.org/HamasCharter
-Morro, Paul. “International Reaction to the Palestinian Unity
Government.” CRS Report for Congress. 2007, May 9.
<http://www.dtic.mil/cgi
bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA468092&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf> (21
Oct. 2009)
-Nobel Lectures, Peace 1991-1995, Editor Irwin Abrams, World Scientific
Publishing Co., Singapore, 1999
109

-Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics
http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/Portals/_pcbs/PressRelease/forecast_e.pdf
-Pape, Robert. Karen A. Mingst and Jack L. Snyder. The Strategic Logic of
Suicide Bombing. Essential Readings in World Politics. New York: W.W.
Norton and Company, Inc., 2008.
-Pfaltzgraff Jr., Robert L. and James E. Dougherty. Contending Theories
of International Relations: A Comprehensive Survey. New York:
Longman, 1997.
-Plen, Matt. “Kadima’s Big Bang.”
<http://www.myjewishlearning.com/israel/Contemporary_Life/Politics/
Electoral_System/Political_Parties/Kadima.shtml> (17 Oct. 2009)
-Rasler, Karen A. “Political Shocks and the Deescalation of Protracted
Conflicts: The Israeli-Palestinian Case.” Evolutionary Interpretations of
World Politics. Ed. William R. Thompson. New York: Routledge, 2001.
- Robinson, James A. Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson. “The
Colonial Origins of Political Development: An Empirical Investigation.”
The American Economic Review. 2001,
-Sharp, Jeremy M. “US Aid to the Palestinians.” CRS Report for
Congress. 2006, Feb 2.
<http://digital.library.unt.edu/govdocs/crs/data/2006/upl-meta-crs9973/RS22370_2006Feb02.pdf> (21 Oct. 2009)
-Skocpol, Theda. Peter B. Evans and Dietrich Rueschemeyer. Bringing
the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research. Australia:
Cambridge University Press, 1985.
-Skocpol, Theda. States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis
of France, Russia and China. New York: Cambridge University Press,
1979.
-Smith, Charles D. Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: A History with
Documents. Massachusetts: Bedford/St. Martin’s. 2010.
-Sprout, Harold and Margaret. “Environmental Factors in the Study of
International Politics”. Sage Publications, Inc. The Journal of Conflict
Resolution, Vol. 1, No. 4 (Dec., 1957).

110

-Stotsky, Steven. “Does Foreign Aid Fuel Palestinian Violence?” The
Middle Easy Query. 2008. <http://www.meforum.org/1926/doesforeign-aid-fuel-palestinian-violence> (21 Oct. 2009)
-Toynbee, Arnold. A Study of History. New York: Oxford University Press,
1946.
-Quigley, John. Palestine and Israel: a Challenge to Justice. North
Carolina: Duke University Press, 1990.
-UN
<http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/5E55786A2DC49DDE8525743
B0046780E>
-Viegas, Luciana. “A Broad Concept of Institution Building.”
<http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/corruption/toolkit/AC_Toolkit_chap
3.pdf >2009. 12 Nov. 2009.
-Wallerstein, Immanuel. The Modern World System. New York: Academic
Press, 1976.
-Weber, Max. The Theory of Social and Economic Organization. New
York: The Free Press, 1947.
-Wurmser, Meyrav. “The Iran-Hamas Alliance.” Hudson Institute. 2007,
Oct. 4.
<https://www.hudson.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=publication_details&id=
5167> (21 Oct. 2009).

111

VITA
Graduate College
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
Jennifer A. Hileman-Tabios
Degrees: Bachelor of Science,
Secondary Education, 2003
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
Thesis Title: A Palestinian State
Thesis Examination Committee:
Chairperson, Mehran Tamadonfar, Ph. D.
Committee Member, John Tuman, Ph. D.
Committee Member, Dennis Pirages, Ph. D.
Graduate Faculty Representative, John Curry, Ph. D.

112

